

# The Role of ATMIS in Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation in Somalia

Dr. Mohamed Ghedi Jumale

## Abstract

Conflict in Somalia has evolved from a civil war in the 1980s, through the breakdown of the state, clan factionalism, and feuding in the 1990s, and into a globalized ideological warfare in the current decade. A protracted civil conflict has been raging in Somalia for the better part of the past three decades. The purpose of this study was to gain an understanding of the function that ATMIS plays in the resolution and reconciliation of Somalia conflict. The study adopted desk research methodology. The analysis was conducted using John Paul Lederaches' reconciliation approaches and the results were based on secondary data taken from the literature. The primary findings suggested that Somalia has only implemented one level of the reconciliation process. While the top-down approach has contributed to a worsening of the conflict, the bottom-up approach that is currently understood by ATMIS is helping to promote national reconciliation in the country. According to the findings of the study, there are two primary factors that contribute to the failure of reconciliation efforts in Somalia. Firstly, the Somali protracted conflict would not have persisted if, for example, ATMIS and the international community had learned from the successful pragmatic reconciliations that had taken place in Somaliland and Puntland. And finally, the function of ATMIS should include women, youth and clan leaders in the reconciliation efforts to build the Somali state.

**Keywords:** *Somalia, Reconciliation, Top–Down, Bottom –Up, Peace building, State-Building.*

## Introduction

The conflict in Somalia has evolved from a civil war in the 1980s, through the breakdown of the state, clan factionalism, and feuding in the 1990s, and into a globalized ideological warfare in the current decade. A protracted civil conflict has been raging in Somalia for the better part of the past three decades. For example, in 2022, the forces of the Somali National Alliance (SNA), in conjunction with the Macwisley militia, were the most active protagonists in the fight against Al Shabaab (AS) (Marry harper,2022)<sup>132</sup>. In spite of this, the total number of SNA operations dropped by a sizeable margin between 2021 and 2022, going from 59 operations in 2021 to only 39 operations in 2022. The frequency of

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<sup>132</sup> Mary Harper. (2022). Somalia and Al-Shabab: The Struggle to Defeat the Militants,” BBC, <http://bitly.ws/yUVC>.

American airstrikes did not change significantly from 2021 to 2022, with the exception of a little increase in the third quarter of 2022. ATMIS did not conduct any large-scale offensive operations against AS, with the exception of one instance in November, when the Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) targeted AS fighters in their hiding place on the fringes of Badhaadhe district in the Lower Juba region.

The Somalia conflict was triggered by a number of circumstances, including political, economic, and land conflicts between diverse parties, beginning with clans vying for control in order to better manage the few resources available in the country.<sup>2</sup> Clan-based conflict tore the nation apart, as clans battled for control of both rural and urban resources while plundering the state's remnants. An estimated 25,000 people were killed during four months of combat in Mogadishu alone in 1991 and 1992, 1.5 million people fled the nation, and at least 2 million people were internally displaced. The protracted battle in Somalia harmed the social cohesiveness and unity of the Somali people, and it led to the demise of the Somali state.<sup>3</sup>

Due to its deep historical roots and extreme complexity, the Somali conflict calls for a comprehensive approach to conflict resolution in order to establish a lasting peace. As a result, this article tries to describe the state-building initiatives that have been undertaken by AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) to find the best strategies and practices for promoting peace in Somalia.<sup>4</sup>

The AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) is a new mission that replaced The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). AMISOM supported Somalia's government in state building through the fight against Al-Shabaab and other responsibilities meant to bring peace and stability for the past 15 years. ATMIS will continue to operate until the end of 2023. Over 18,000 soldiers, 1,000 police, and 70 civilians make up ATMIS' capacity, and the majority of its mandate is the same as that of its predecessor.<sup>5</sup>

## Historical Context of the Conflict

A mixture of internal and foreign circumstances led to the demise of the Somali state as the conflict evolved from a civil war in the 1980s and into a globalized ideological warfare in the current decade.<sup>6</sup> The disintegration reached its peak in 1988 when the Somali National Movement (SNM) raided military

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<sup>1</sup> Mary Harper. (2022). Somalia and Al-Shabab: The Struggle to Defeat the Militants,” BBC, <http://bitly.ws/yUVC>.

<sup>2</sup> Khayre, Ahmed Ali M. (2016). Somalia: An Overview of the Historical and Current Situation. SSRN Electronic Journal. 10.2139/ssrn.2771125.

<sup>3</sup> Bade, Zakarie Abdi & Abdi, Abdifatah. (2021). Understanding Somali Conflict: Causes, Consequences and Strategies for Peace-Building.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid

<sup>5</sup> <https://atmis-au.org/>

<sup>6</sup> Mudane, Hassan. (2018). The Somali Civil War: Root cause, and contributing variables. The Journal of social studies. 04

bases in Burco and Hargeisa, escalating the insurgency into a fully-fledged civil war. The government responded by attacking the Isaaq tribe resulting into the death of about 50,000 people and 650,000 people were forced to flee to Ethiopia and Djibouti. Foreign aid that had supported Somalia was cut off as its strategic significance to the West decreased. President Barre lost control of the nation and the army because he lacked the resources to keep the system of patronage politics in place. He was driven out of Mogadishu in January 1991 by United Somali Congress (USC) forces, who were helped by the Hawiye clans in south-central Somalia.

The Djibouti government's futile efforts to mediate a compromise in June and July 1991 represented the first attempt to save Somalia. Only in early 1992, when a truce was established between the two main combatants in Mogadishu, General Mohamed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed, did UN diplomatic engagement start. To stop the violence and deal with the famine, the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), a limited UN peacekeeping deployment, was established. The mission, however, was unable to disarm factions or broker a cessation of hostilities. Furthermore, the Addis Ababa peace conference in 1993 and the Kenya peace conference in 1994, both organized by the UN, failed to spark a national process of reconciliation and state restoration.<sup>7</sup>

As Western countries withdrew from Somalia, regional states like Ethiopia stepped up to the diplomatic plate. For its part, Djibouti played a pivotal role by initiating the 'Arta process,' which resulted in the formation of a Transitional National Government (TNG) with widespread popular and international backing. However, this state –building effort was shuttered with the rise of Islamist movements that aimed to transform Somalia into an Islamic state inspired by Salafism and Wahhabism, as well as more conservative sufi orders. In 2006, with the help of other clan militia, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) drove a coalition of warlords out of Mogadishu that had been supported by the international community.

In December 2006, Ethiopian forces entered Somalia with the tacit support of Western nations. They installed the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Mogadishu after driving out the ICU. As a result, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1744 of 2007 authorized the deployment of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in early 2007 to safeguard the Transitional Federal Government.

The AU PSC Communique of 2007 instructed AMISOM, in its paragraph 8 among other things to:

*“(i) provide support to the TFIs in their efforts towards the stabilisation of the situation in the country and the furtherance of dialogue and reconciliation, (ii) facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, and (iii) create conducive conditions for long-term stabilisation, reconstruction and development in Somalia’*

Although AMISOM's mandate has changed over the years, it has always included the following core responsibilities: protecting federal institutions and assisting them in performing their government functions; encouraging dialogue and reconciliation; safeguarding civilians, critical infrastructure, and sensitive sites; facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid; and supporting stabilization efforts.<sup>8</sup>

AMISOM operations have three key characteristics of conflict dynamics: They involve conflicts for power, politics centered on individuals' identities, and the political economics of organized violence. With the collapse of the central government of Somalia in 1991, there has been a string of clearly political

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid

<sup>8</sup> Williams, Paul. (2013). The African Union Mission in Somalia and Civilian Protection Challenges. *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development*. 2. 10.5334/sta.bz.

power struggles to reconstitute state and regional institutions and, more importantly, to control them. These efforts have been going on ever since. From the early 2000s, with a considerable increase in the number of external resources that were flowing into Somalia's state-building project, this aspect of the conflict has become significantly more intense. In the region where AMISOM is active, political power conflicts have mostly centered on the acquisition of control of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and, later, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). By the latter half of 2012, these fights for dominance have spread to include the newly formed regional administrations or federal member states (FMS).<sup>9</sup>

Identity politics or, to put it more broadly, the sociocultural facets of Somali society are a second aspect of armed conflict.<sup>10</sup> As a provider of security, justice, and employment, this is frequently most directly related to clan dynamics and conflicts over relative authority and influence among Somalia's numerous clans, and sub-clans. But the issue of who is included or excluded from particular groups is also a part of identity politics. For all parties aiming to create constituencies that cross numerous clan identities, the question of who is allowed to speak authentically about interpreting religious beliefs or ideas of local justice is particularly important.

The politics and economics of violence is the focus of a third important part of the problem. In the south-central region of Somalia, many different types of organized violence have regularly displayed an intimate relationship with economic issues. These issues include the trading of *khat*, charcoal, and sugar; taxation, extortion, and the privatization of security; and the struggle to control key commercial hubs such as seaports, airports, and roadways. There was a lack of efficient state governance in Somalia, which led to the emergence of a large number of armed players who relied on various forms of coercion and violence in order to make money.<sup>11</sup>

### **State-Building Efforts**

State-building is one of the most important aspects for a country that has been torn apart by conflict.<sup>12</sup> This is because it establishes and fortifies the institutions that are required to sustain long-term economic, social, and political progress. In order to accomplish this goal, peace must come first. In the context of Somalia, initiatives for peace building have been initiated as a prerequisite and an important component to reconstruct the country and dissuade the country from returning to the conflict that paralyzed the country's political stability and development growth. As a consequence of this, activities aimed at resolving conflicts and fostering reconciliation are essential components required for the reconstruction of Somalia. The process of conflict reconciliation helps in the healing of the grievances and wounds of the victims, the perpetrators, and the civil war rivalries. It also establishes mechanisms to ensure the coherence and coexistence of the community, which is built through a conciliation process of factual and just elements.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid

<sup>10</sup> Bussey, Marcus & Farah, Osman & Randhir, Mr & Gautam, Kumar & Paul, Abhijeet & Farah, Osman & Eno, Mohamed. (2022). *Theorizing Somali Society: Hope, Transformation and Development*.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid

<sup>12</sup> Menocal, Alina. (2010). *State-Building for Peace - A New Paradigm For International Engagement In Post- Conflict Fragile States?* European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS), EUI-RSCAS Working Papers. 32. 10.2307/41341196.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid

Since its deployment in March 2007, AMISOM can be credited with the following main achievements.<sup>14</sup> First, AMISOM was vital in protecting the transitional Government and the ensuing Somali Federal Governments. South central Somalia was in the midst of many entities and warlords laying claim to different areas of the country. Hence, there was a great deal of conflict in this region. Mogadishu has been rocked by recurrent outbreaks of violence, which have resulted in the deaths of a large number of civilians and the relocation of others. In point of fact, the majority of the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI), such as the Transitional Federal Parliament, was located in Baidoa town around 80 kilometers to the west of Mogadishu. As a result of these factors, therefore, some of the most visible, stabilizing, and far-reaching achievements of AMISOM was the recapture of various swathes of territory that had previously been under the control of Al-Shabaab (AS) and various other Armed Opposition Groups (AOGs), as well as the expansion of territorial space in which the Government and its Institutions could project their authority, continue dialogue and reconciliation efforts, and carry out their functions as government.<sup>15</sup>

Second, AMISOM degraded Al Shabab and pushed the bulk of its forces from Mogadishu and from all other liberated areas across the sectors. AMISOM began the process of capturing cities and towns then under the control of Al Shabaab. The following major offensive operations were undertaken: Panua Eneo (2011); Free Shabelle, Eagles (March 2014), Indian Ocean (November 2014), Ocean Build (Nov 2014- July 2015), Juba Corridor (July 2015), Badbaado 1a and 1b (2018-2019). These operations led to the recovery of vast majority of towns and cities in Somalia, allowing governance, economic, social, and political activities to thrive in the country.<sup>16</sup>

AMISOM has played critical roles in a number of political, reconciliation, and state-building processes, culminating in the formation of new Federal Member States (FMS) in Galmudug, Hirshabelle, South- West, and Jubaland, as well as the establishment of the Banadir Regional Administration in Mogadishu. AMISOM has also provided institutional capacity building activities, gender mainstreaming, protection issues, and guidance on International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law to relevant line ministries. AMISOM's activities in this area have strengthened Somalia's drive toward state

building and federalism, as well as bringing democratic dividends that are more tangible at the grassroots level.<sup>17</sup>

Third, AMISOM assisted in the process of establishing south-central Somalia's new Regional Administrations by providing transportation for attendees and security at many conferences: Jubaland (2013), South West (2014), Galmudug (2015), and Hirshabelle (2016). Without such regional organizations, Somalia would be unable to create a federal system of government.

Finally, throughout the years 2012, 2016–2017, and 2022, AMISOM played a critical part in ensuring the smooth running of two election processes that led to the formation of new federal governments. Last but not least, throughout the entirety of its mission in Somalia, AMISOM has been responsible for laying the foundation of security that has allowed the majority of the international diplomatic and humanitarian communities to conduct their operations out of Mogadishu and elsewhere in south-central Somalia. It is

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<sup>15</sup> Madeira, Francisco (2022). Exit of AMISOM: Consolidating Gains and Charting New Trajectories in the African Union Presence in Somalia. Relief Web. <https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/exit-amisom-consolidating-gains-and-charting-new-trajectories-african-union-presence>

<sup>16</sup> Lusiola, Albert. (2021). Key Challenges Facing AMISOM in Military Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa. *African Journal of Empirical Research*. 2. 54-67. 10.51867/ajer.v2i2.22.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid

exceedingly doubtful, with very few exceptions, that the various new or resurrected embassies would have been created without the security that AMISOM provides. In the same vein, AMISOM ensured the safety of hundreds of visits by different VIPs, which allowed for greater attention to be paid to Somalia in a number of different international forums.<sup>18</sup>

## **Analysis of Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation in Somalia**

### **Top-Down Approach**

Using a top-down strategy, AMISOM pursued a Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) approach to state building as a process that creates greater stability and reduces security threats.<sup>19</sup> The DDR seeks to dismantle the army, camps, and weapons of opposing factions in order to build up society' capacity for violence prevention. There are three steps in the DDR procedure. The first two stages are intended to address serious security risks, while the third stage focuses on peace building and attempts to reduce militants' motivation to engage in combat. In the first stage, known as disarmament, weapons are taken away from formerly hostile groups, stored in secure locations, and subsequently destroyed. Another procedure that disbands various armed groups closes militant camps, and separates ex combatants from militant groups is demobilization.

Reintegration is the last step, where soldiers try to go back to their old homes or new places. To return to their prior life and reintegrate into the community, the militants receive jobs, trauma healing, psychological counseling, and education throughout this period. A third party facilitates the process of reconciliation, which involves altering the dynamics of the connection that exists between those who have been wronged and those who have committed the wrongdoing in order to pave the way for a more harmonious and shared future.<sup>20</sup> In the context of Somalia, the AMIOSM Mission was not successful in transforming the relationship between victims and their perpetrators, facilitating the healing of trauma, or building confidence between the various clans, all of which would have played an essential part in the process of peace building in Somalia.

Furthermore, fourteen national reconciliation conferences held with the objective of reinstating a central authority in Somalia by international actors were unsuccessful in accomplishing this goal. The most direct cause of this was the fact that the warlords and faction leaders who had signed the peace treaty and committed to work together to build a national government did not keep the commitments they had made to one another very often. The primary reason for these warlords' inability to keep their commitments was that they did not trust one another. Moreover, they dreaded the prospect of being sidelined in the national government, which would have resulted in a reduction in both their economic and political influence.

All of these efforts took a top-down approach to peacemaking, involving only the fighting parties, faction heads, and opinions of the former local politicians. Instead of addressing the underlying factors that led to the conflict, these reconciliation conferences sought to rebuild the demolished state. Power-sharing

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid

<sup>19</sup> Ekpootu, Mfon. (2018). Women in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Programs in the Horn of Africa: Northern Uganda and Somalia in Review. The HORN Bulletin, Volume I; Issue IV.

<sup>20</sup> Doyle, Michael & Peterson, Kris. (2005). Re-Entry and Reintegration: Returning Home after Combat. *The Psychiatric quarterly*. 76. 361-70. 10.1007/s11126-005-4972-z.

arrangements and political viewpoints, however, served as the common denominator of all the endeavors. This strategy, which was driven by outside actors and manipulated by the neighboring nations, especially Ethiopia and Kenya, failed to take into account the opinions of clan chiefs at the local level. Mohamed,<sup>21</sup> contends that this top-down strategy contributed to Somalia's protracted turmoil and violence.

### **Way Forward: Bottom-up approach of conflict resolution and reconciliation**

Throughout the past 15 years, AMISOM has made tremendous progress in building the Somalia state.<sup>22</sup> These successes have resulted in considerable advances. The mandate of the newly adapted mission, known as the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), reflects the changing circumstances in the nation as well as the sustained dedication of the African Union to assist Somalia in its efforts to regain permanent peace, security, and stability.

Therefore, to build the Somalia state, the first critical stage for Somali clans is to acknowledge and express their support for the concept of a reconciliation process. The next step is to figure out how to resolve clan disagreements and grievances, which may require forgiving one another. In order to accomplish this goal, Somalia needs a genuine bottom-up reconciliation process. The ATMIS Mission reconciliation process is increasingly playing a major role in addressing and reinforcing reconciliation while also providing critical support to the Somali federal government. When this is taken into consideration, the ATMIS Mission has the responsibility of ensuring that the process of reconciliation may be developed from the ground up and is inclusive of all clan divisions in Somalia.

A bottom-up reconciliation that was pushed and led by Somalis has been encouraged by the ATMIS Mission as part of an effort to establish the space necessary for the many aspects of clan conflict to be resolved through dialogue, reconciliation, and negotiation. For instance, ATMIS has recently finished conducting several training sessions on conflict resolution and reconciliation for representatives from the states of Hir Shabelle and Galmudug. The goal of these training sessions was to teach participants how to mediate conflicts in order to bolster efforts to promote peace at the grassroots level. Over the course

of the three days, the participants (prominent elders, clan leaders, religious leaders, women and youth) were led through oral and practical lessons, including group work, on understanding conflict, the causes of conflict, reconciliation, and the best practices for conflict resolution. In addition, the participants were given more specific information on the types of generic traditional conflict.

Under the bottom-up strategy, the peace process should not be thought of as a single procedure that can be completed in its whole. In previous peace processes, efforts were made to establish a government for Somalia; however, little had been done to raise the people's awareness of the situation, to identify the social, cultural, and political constraints for the process, or to prepare the Somali society to accept the government once it was established. Building up local capability and establishing fundamental institutions is an absolutely necessary step toward establishing a stable peace in Somalia. Accessibility on a strategic level and the mobilization of those locales and communities, as well as segments of society like older

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<sup>21</sup> Mohamed, i Elmi (2021). Post Conflict National reconciliation in Somalia. Bachelor thesis on Peace and Development Studies, Linnaeus University.

<sup>22</sup> Ali, Samira & Pandey, Neelam. (2020). An Assessment Role of AMISOM in the Peace building Process in Somalia: A Study: n assessment role of AMISOM in peace building process in Somalia: A study. *Humanities & Social Sciences Reviews*. 8. 1073-1081. [10.18510/hssr.2020.8311](https://doi.org/10.18510/hssr.2020.8311)

people and women, who are willing to participate in the process are also essential steps in the direction of achieving peace.<sup>23</sup>

### **The Role of Women**

In Somalia, the women play a significant part in the process of reunifying communities that have been divided. In traditional Somali society, women play a role that is not directly involved in dispute resolution but is nonetheless significant. They have the ability to act as peace envoys for their clans at the beginning stages of a conflict and are often the "first messengers" dispatched between disputing clans in order to break the ice and begin negotiations. Even though the country was still in the midst of its civil conflict, women all around Somalia were actively participating in efforts to foster peace and make peace.

At the grass-roots and community level, women have respect from their traditional leaders (clan chiefs), elders, and politicians, and they are able to have some influence on them. In recognition of this reality, the Life and Peace Institute has placed a significant emphasis on the facilitation of women's participation in the peace building process. This has been accomplished through the provision of direct capacity building and training, as well as support for special gatherings of women. Hence, in order to ensure that women are at the forefront of any efforts to bring peace to Somalia, they need to be given more agencies. They ought to be permitted to take part in any future peace and reconciliation conferences as well as the decision-making procedures associated with those gatherings.

### **Cross-clan and sub-clan marriage relations**

Finding relationships between sub-clans and other clans through marriage could be an important step in the process of forging peace from the ground up. Marriages between members of different clans and sub-clans are very common in Somali society.<sup>24</sup> Young people in Somali society are encouraged to marry into groups where new relationships can be developed since marriage is seen as a contract between families or lineages in Somali culture. Marriage is a unifying force that can assist members of various clans and subclans forge closer bonds with one another and find peaceful resolutions to any conflicts that may arise. Marriages between members of different clans foster diplomatic contacts between

communities and are consequently accorded a high level of deference. Marriage not only helps to solidify the ties that bind distinct lineages, but it also frequently serves as the catalyst for interaction between various clans and subclans. So, in a bottom-up approach to peacebuilding, cross-clan marital interactions could be used to reconcile problems between communities as a means of bringing about peace. Individuals who have married into various clans and subclans have the potential to play a pivotal role in reducing tensions and improving attitudes between communities that are traditionally at odds with one another so that they can cooperate in the pursuit of long-term peace.

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<sup>23</sup> Nyadera, Israel & Agwanda, Billy. (2019). Transformation of the Somali Civil-War and Reflections for a Social Contract Peacebuilding Process. *Gaziantep University Journal of Social Sciences*. 18. 1346-1366. 10.21547/jss.536203.

<sup>24</sup> Aengwony, Robert & Itoyo, Prof & Simiyu, Ruth. (2019). Nature and Extent of Inter-Clan Conflicts in the Somali Community in Wajir North Sub-County, Kenya. *The International Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities Invention*. 6. 5580-5595. 10.18535/ijsshi/v6i8.06.

## **Timing**

There shouldn't be any time constraints placed on the peace process because the bottom-up method necessitates the development of a mutual understanding and confidence among the people involved.<sup>25</sup> A sufficient amount of time must be made available in order to discover a quality settlement, which may be defined as one that deals with the fundamental concerns of the conflict in an efficient manner. If this requirement is not met, and the negotiators are compelled to make a decision in a hasty manner, it is possible that poor quality agreements will be reached. These kinds of challenges, which include having a limited amount of time and having to make a decision in a hurry, have provided peacemakers with sour lessons that they should not forget, particularly those that were learned during the conference in Addis Ababa that was sponsored by the United Nations in 1993.

In relation to the timetable, it is important for the mediators in the peace process to be familiar with the social and cultural realities of the communities with which they are working. This will allow them to comprehend the genuine issues that are plaguing the culture and contribute to the effort of finding solutions to those issues. Only intermediaries who understand the cultural nuances of the society as an issue and who enjoy the *Confianza* (something more than simply 'trust') of the adversary can hope to carry out intermediary roles successfully in protracted conflicts between societies that have mutual suspicion and distrust of each other.

## **Somali Traditional Peace and Reconciliation Mechanism**

When we look at Somali traditional processes for maintaining peace and reconciliation known as *Xeer*, the bottom-up approach has a lot of obvious appeal in Somalia.<sup>26</sup> *Xeer* is a precedent-based social code that is thought to apply to all Somali people. It acted as a necessary constraint and regulating guidance in controversies and feuds between groups and individuals in Somali society. *Xeer* was developed in the 15th century. It is analogous to an impromptu village council, and it is a meeting at which all adult males are ostensibly allowed to express their opinions and concerns. It is the most democratic strategy, since it allows all people to participate equally in the process of electing their leaders and forming

their administration. Disputes may be resolved amicably using this method, and it is also the most effective.<sup>27</sup>

In the sense that it comprises social and political norms and contracts, and in the sense that it promotes a decentralized political power that is controlled by community leaders, Xeer is consistent with the bottom-up approach. In the modern Somalia, which is still plagued by anarchy and the disintegration of the state, Xeer is an institution that attempts to arbitrate social and political arrangements. Experiments with Xeer have been carried out in both Somaliland and Puntland, and they have produced very positive results thus far. These two areas were successful in establishing institutions that are both mandated for, and have experience in, resolving conflict and continuing obligations in establishing peace. These institutions are governed by a council of elders. Not only is the council of elders successful in writing a constitution but also in filling government positions and this is especially true in Somaliland.

It's possible that Somaliland and Puntland might act as examples for how to stabilize the other regions. State-building is a process of negotiation that takes place in a highly political environment rather than

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<sup>25</sup> Mitchell, David. (2020). Comparative consultation: The theory and practice of 'sharing lessons' between peace processes. *Cooperation and Conflict*. 56. 001083672092091. 10.1177/0010836720920914.

<sup>26</sup> Leite, Natasha (2017). Reinvigoration of Somali Traditional Justice through Inclusive Conflict Resolution Approaches. Relief Web. <https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/reinvigoration-somali-traditional-justice-through-inclusive-conflict-resolution>.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid

being a legal and technical endeavor. Negotiated statehood produced Somaliland and Puntland. Politicians, senior citizens, the military, corporations, members of civil society, NGOs, and representatives of the larger international community all participated in the negotiations. These actors engage in negotiation utilizing a variety of tactics and discourses, alternating between rhetoric and networks based on states and clans.<sup>28</sup>

The building of Somalia state would not be difficult to accomplish if all of the areas were successful in developing community-based administrative institutions. Realize that true peace for Somalia can only come from the Somali people themselves, via the participation of traditional and indigenous peace and reconciliation institutions, and without the domination of the international community. This is something that must be recognized.<sup>29</sup>

### **Power and Resources Sharing**

The inability to find a solution to the problem of electricity and resource distribution was a significant contributor to the collapse of earlier peace initiatives in Somalia. The dilemma of power and resource sharing is not unique to the Somali situation; rather, it is a factor that determines the outcome of the majority of civil conflicts and intrastate conflicts. It stands to reason given that these battles are fought over positions of power and influence within society. It is possible to handle the engagement of parties in a society after a war by doing the following: giving space to a host of players who have been previously silenced or excluded from influence in the community. If none of the involved parties have a sense of safety, the peace process is doomed to fail due to the fact that it "involves power over government." This is because the resources of the government can either be utilized to sustain the security dilemma or to overcome it. As a result, safeguarding the safety of all parties involved should be an essential component of any peace process.<sup>30</sup>

If one of the fighting parties is concerned about its security after the accord or in the next government, then the accord will almost probably be derailed by this concern. Even a very modest but devoted group of individuals is capable of carrying out a string of violent acts that can result in the breakdown of the peace process. Hence, participation from all parties is necessary for any peace process to achieve its goal of success. In addition, for a peace

process to be effective, it is necessary for power and resources to be shared in an equitable manner. Yet, shared control may call for a certain level of confidence, and it may also be an arrangement that is only meant to be transitory during a moment of change. This is the system through which all parties are given representation in the government in accordance with a formula that was decided upon in advance.

Consequently, the employment of the bottom-up strategy is suitable for overcoming the existing problems of power and resource-sharing, as well as the dilemmas regarding participation and security, in the context of the Somali situation. Traditional Somali methods of land management include conflict mediation, judicial adjudication, agricultural and grazing systems, and a variety of other tasks relating to these areas. Somalis use this system to resolve disagreements regarding power, territory, resources, and the safety of various clans and towns. A broad-based power sharing is something that the Somali people are looking for, in part as a nod to their nation's history and in part as a search for a more participatory future. Because of this, any new model of government needs to incorporate power sharing, which can only be achieved through a bottom-up strategy in order to be representative of all Somalis. This is a requirement for any new model of state building.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Marchal, Roland. (2010). *The Puntland State of Somalia. A Tentative Social Analysis*. HAL Id: hal-01044642.

<sup>29</sup> Mitchell, David. (2020). *Comparative consultation: The theory and practice of ‘sharing lessons’ between peace processes*. *Cooperation and Conflict*. 56. 001083672092091. 10.1177/0010836720920914

<sup>30</sup> Sriram, Chandra & Zahar, Marie-Joelle. (2009). *The Perils of Power-Sharing: Africa and Beyond*. *Africa Spectrum*. 44. 11-39. 10.1177/000203970904400302

## **NGOs and Civil Society**

In order to strengthen local competence, the ATMIS mission must collaborate with NGOs and civil society. With awareness-raising campaigns and the implementation of various socioeconomic projects that benefit the local population, NGOs and civil society might make a significant contribution to the peace process in Somalia<sup>32</sup>. Through influencing people's hearts and minds to foster mutual trust and confidence, civil society groups and NGOs can elevate the hopes of members of various clans so that they can all strive arduously for a lasting peace. These people are the parents of the warlords and fighters who have ravaged the nation. It might be simple to end warlordism if society could grow in mutual trust and confidence.

The tales that parents pass on to their offspring have a significant role in ensuring social cohesion and stability in every culture. If one teaches children stories of animosity and hostility, the conflict and mistrust will likely persist until the next generation. Hence, civil societies, organizations at the grassroots level, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are required to alter the hearts and minds of Somali people in order for them to begin burying the sorrow, bitterness, and animosity of the past for the sake of peace and a united Somalia.

## **Conclusion**

The Somali people are in dire need of constructing a state at the present time. With a tremendous amount of devastation in Somalia's economic, social, and political domains, as well as the loss of lives, the people deserve some kind of peace. In every prior attempt at peace, the Somali people have maintained the hope that they will eventually hear positive news, news of peace and togetherness. Sadly, the majority of previous peace initiatives were not successful in bringing about the stable peace that Somalis have longed for over the course of several decades. The unequal distribution of power and wealth among the various Somali clans and sub-clans is said to be one of the primary factors contributing to the conflict. In any of the prior initiatives, not a single one of these problems was ever resolved. In the prior attempts at achieving peace, the top-down strategy, in which a

centralized administration was constructed by beginning with the highest-level leadership, was utilized. A top-down strategy would not be able to solve the Somali problem, however, because of the animosity and mistrust that exists amongst the Somali clans. Using a bottom-up strategy is the only method that has any chance of being successful in resolving the problem in Somalia.

When it came to settling conflicts and bringing about peace, the ATMIS mission, formerly known as AMISOM, utilized both a top-down and a bottom-up approach and experienced both success and failure in some areas. Recent events have made it abundantly evident that ATMIS has selected the bottom-up approach as a holistic and community-centered long-term model that has the potential to bring about peace that is sustainable in Somalia. In order to take a bottom-up strategy in Somalia, the local people need to be given more support, public awareness needs to be raised, and the process needs to include representation and participation from all segments of the community. Women and older people, two segments of society that are relatively easy to reach, should play significant roles in the peace efforts. In Somalia, the process of peace building ought to be indigenously driven and should be approached from the ground up. The reconciliation process should begin on Somalia's own soil and work its way up through the country. It should also succeed in winning the support and approval of the Somali people.

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<sup>31</sup> Ahmed, Nasteha. (2019). Somalia's Struggle to Integrate Traditional and Modern Governance Systems: The 4.5 Formula and the 2012 Provisional Constitution. *Journal of Somali Studies*. 6. 41-69. 10.31920/2056- 5682/2019/v6n1a2.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid

By ATMIS mission taking a bottom-up approach, it is conceivable that Somalis at the grassroots level will be given the opportunity to play a key part in the building of the Somali state. ATMIS ought to limit themselves to acting in the capacity of facilitators and security force for the process. In addition to that, they ought to offer some form of moral support for the process.

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