

Revisiting The Causes of the Somali Civil War in The Light of the Protracted Social Conflict Perspective

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Abstract

Somalia, like many other African countries, has experienced a state of civil war which has brought a total state collapse and a deep-rooted conflict that fragmented the country, deteriorated the physical security, and caused institutional deformity. The anarchic condition resulted in the halting of the basic social services such as education, healthcare and public security. It also led to a catastrophic condition such as famine and drought. As a result, Somalia became synonymous with failed state, terrorism, warlords, famine, tribal wars and even pirates. The paper utilizes a qualitative approach that undertakes a critical evaluation of the literature on Somalia's civil war to demonstrate the underlying causes of and thereby offer a strong explanation for its outbreak. It aims to investigate the role of the politicized communal content, deterioration of basic needs, state's repressive role and international linkages in the outbreak of the Somali civil war. The investigation revealed that these causal forces are the necessary underlying causes, proven to be sufficient conditions for the ongoing civil war.

Keywords: *The Somali civil war, PSC, Primordialist, Instrumentalist*

Introduction

Following the 1969 bloodless military coup that brought military regime to power, and predominantly after the Ogaden War, Somalia suffered under a cruel dictatorial regime that supported animosity among Somali clan families and used army forces to put down popular protests. By 1991, when the military regime collapsed, the Somali people faced catastrophic conditions such as famine, drought, and destructive civil war. (Ahmed Samatar and Terrence Lyons 1995: P. 8). The nature of the Somali civil war changed over time. In late 1991, the civil war was mainly clan warfare between the Somali clan families in the south and central parts of the country. By early 1992, the responsible forces driving Somalia's civil war led to a new phase, a highly destructive one, in which Daarood and Hawiye tribe-families engaged in deadly civil war (Menkhous 2003).

The end of the cold war had a major influence on the genesis of Somalia's civil war. The ideological rivalry between Russia and USA was one of the battlegrounds on which the

Somalis adversaries sought to fight each other. These adversaries had a dynamic of their own. Russia and USA, both are said to have become involved in Somalia's civil war because of each other's opposite interests (Guimarães, F. A. 2000: P. 11). These International influences will be shown to have become expressed in the civil war.

In the 1970s and 1980s, the two major superpowers were seriously involved in supporting patrons in Africa, particularly in the Horn of African countries, notable Somalia and Ethiopia. In the process of pursuing what they considered their own geopolitical and economic interests, the superpowers contributed to hastening of a regional arms race. During this period, Russia and USA, its alliance jockeyed to check each other, while Somalia and Ethiopia outwit one another. As a result of this, was the Ogaden War of 1977-1978. (Joseph K. Nkaisserry 1997: P. 3). Somalia's civil war is one of the armed conflicts that have engulfed Africa in the early 1990s. Some scholars argued that the civil war can be traced back to the legacy of the Ogaden War which ended in 1978.

In the late 1990s when the Soviet Union disintegrated, many scholars expected that peace in a unipolar world would prevail. Instead, several intra-state wars broke out in different parts of the world. Various rebel factions, clan identity groups challenged states' monopoly over domestic security and violence. Consequently, a number of states collapsed and experienced years of civil war. Many African countries such as Somalia, South Sudan, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Congo are examples of states that experienced protracted civil wars. Many scholars often described these civil wars as clan-based conflicts. (Elmi 2006: P. 1).

The Somali Civil War is an ongoing civil war that is taking place in Somalia. It has also proven to be long and devastating to its people. The table below shows the phases of the Somali Civil War which was proven to be long and devastating to its people.



Source: Internal analysis

Somalia's civil war is considered in the work of Edward Azar to examine the role played by deprivation of basic needs, state's repressive role and external linkages. His work understands the nature and implications of social conflicts, and other sadistic internal political transformations, which made them, in their very essence, global events. A theoretical approach to achieve the purpose of this paper has been suggested by Edward Azar. He pointed out that "the genesis component of our model identifies a set of conditions that are responsible for the transformation of non-conflictual situations into conflictual ones." (E. Azar 1990: P. 7).

This paper has adopted this theoretical approach and sets out to systematically analyze the root factors that influenced the outbreak of Somalia's civil war after the collapse of the military regime. This is done by first examining the existing literature on the Somali civil war. The history of post-colonial Somalia, particularly the post-1991 era, has been plagued by deep-rooted conflict. As a result, the country remains a deeply troubled one, and it will take years to reconstruct. The civil war did not suddenly begin with the overthrow of dictatorship regime of Siad Barre, but it was observable in most parts of the country for some time before the leave of traditional institutions that had traditionally secured solidity in the society. The Somali nation-state formation was on the off-beam way since the very beginning. The outbreak of the civil war was, thus, not surprising. (Barbora Rýdlová 2007). Literature on Somalia's civil war has attracted so many scholars from separate academic disciplines including Political Scientists, Economists, Anthropologists, Sociologists. Two

schools of thought have emerged to find out the root causes of the civil war: Primordialists and Instrumentalists. Somalia's civil war has multiple causal forces. Competition for resources, a repressive state and colonial legacy are regarded as reasons behind the Somali civil war. (Elmi & Barise 2006). In the view of primordialists (traditionalists), the Somali civil war was a product of clan rivalry and age-old hatreds. Another leading school of thought, the Instrumentalist, viewed Somalia's civil war as a result of the economic crisis in the late 1980s, competition for resources and state power, elite manipulation and colonial legacy.

It will be argued that most scholars of Somalia focused only on the genesis of the civil war but they overlooked the role played by the following major factors: Politicized clan identity, deprivation of basic needs, state's depressive role and international linkages. However, this paper will explain the root causes of the Somali civil war. It views Somalia's civil war as a deep-rooted civil war that resulted from a combination of four factors such as politicization of communal content, deprivation of basic needs, state's repressive role and international linkages.

Research Question

This paper focuses on understanding the underlying causes of Somalia's civil war. It is being 32 years now since the outbreak of the civil war, the longest recorded in Africa's post-independence history. It exploded into one of the worst political crisis in the African continent. The civil war in Somalia is not unusual in the overall African scenario. The whole Africa is in fact still torn apart by several cases of armed conflicts and political violence, which obstruct the development of many African regimes. South Sudan, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ethiopia and Eritrea, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Nigeria are merely some examples of the civil unrests that badly affect the continent and make peace and stability unattainable. Since the post-1991 era, there have been many violent conflicts mainly based on clan warfare led by local clan-based warlords who ravaged the south and central part of Somalia. Some scholars of Somalia often described it as a result of a competition for resources and power, colonial legacy, ancient hatreds and clan rivalry among Somali clan families. In this paper, I will attempt to answer this

question: What are the underlying causes of the Somali civil war? The research question will mainly focus on the role played by deprivation of basic needs, communal content, state's repressive role and international linkages in the outbreak of Somalia's civil war in 1991.

Purpose of the Study

The main aims of this research study are to explain the underlying causes of Somalia's civil war and to apply the basic concepts from the Edward Azar's theory of Protracted Social Conflict to the Somali civil war.

Problem Statement

Majority of the literature that explains the civil war in Somalia give clan rivalry and genealogical divisions among Somali clan families priority. Specifically, the literature focuses on ancient hatreds and clan differences among Somali clans as the major causal factors. (I. M. Lewis 1961; Kusow 1994). Many scholars of Somalia have questioned the validity of such claims. (Abdi Samatar 1992; Ahmed Samatar; 1988; Abdi Dirshe; 2013; Ssereo 2003; Ingririis 2016; Kapteijns 2004; Osman A. A. 2007; Elmi and Barise 2006; Menkhous 2003).

Although much has been written on the genesis of Somalia's civil war, yet the politicization of clan identity, deprivation of basic needs, state's repressive role and external linkages remains inapprehensible. Moreover, since the civil war broke out in 1991, there have been many scholarly explanations offered by different scholars about the civil war, however, neither of these explanations have an explanatory power.

Therefore, this paper aims to fill the gap in the literature by examining the role of politicized communal content, deprivation of basic needs, state's repressive role and international linkages in Somalia's civil war case. It urges us to adopt fresh perspectives by presenting an alternative explanation.

Significance of the Study

The study is significant in terms of generating a new debate for contemporary Somali studies. The theoretical contribution such as the academic support of Edward Azar's Theory of Protracted Social Conflict used to analyze the civil war in Somalia will contribute theoretically to the existing literature on the Somali civil war.

I think this study is important for several reasons. The study will offer an alternative approach to the Somali civil war. Secondly, the method and the technique of collecting information used in this paper will function as an important base for future research in this area.

Methodology

The research study has two main aims: To explain the underlying aspects of the Somali civil war. To apply the basic concepts from the Edward Azar's Theory of Protracted Social Conflict to the Somali civil war by using mainly secondary sources.

The type of methodology that will be used is based on a qualitative approach. The author will examine the role of politicized communal content, deprivation of basic needs, the state's repressive role and the international linkages in the Somali civil war case through critical evaluation of the available literature on Somalia's civil war.

Literature Review

This paper reviews the available literature on Somalia's civil war. The Somali civil war was an integral part of the political catastrophes that engulfed Africa in the early 1990s. The end of the cold war in the early 1990s, led to the outbreak of new conflict in Africa, tied to ethnicity or tribalism. This new phenomenon occurs within the borders of states as opposed to between states. One of the unique characteristics of the new phenomenon is that, it tends to have a strong underlying component of clan identity. Many scholars have been interested in understanding and explaining this new phenomenon. Kaldor (1999: P. 1) described it as a "new war," and noted that "During the 1980s and 1990s, a new type of organized violence developed especially in Africa...which is one aspect of the current globalized era. I describe this type of violence as a new war." Furthermore, she claimed that this new war was the product of "intensification of global interconnectedness."

Accordingly, the new wars have to be understood in the context of globalization. (Kaldor 1999: P. 3). However, it is not a “new war” but rather it has long existed and dominated the domestic arena, and one might argue that it has come to replace interstate as a primary source of international conflicts in the modern era. This phenomenon of new war does not exist in a continental vacuum; mostly it was hosted by the African countries. As Elbadaw and Sambanis (2000: P. 1) observed: “Over the last 40 years nearly 20 African countries or about 40% of Sub Sahara Africa have experienced at least one period of civil war.” Since the late 1990s, the continent has been characterized by a number of armed conflicts tied to ethnicity such as the genocide in Rwanda, the civil war in Sudan, Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone and many more. These civil wars were very immediate, divisive and destructive for civilians.

It is widely seen as a product of ethnic diversity and ancient hatreds (Weir 2012), security dilemma (Posen 1993), inadequate state authority (Ayoob 1996), greed or economic opportunities (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Collier 1999), inequality (Curr 1993), grievance (Ellibsen 2000; Azar 1990), failed political institutions and poverty (Sambani and Elbadawi 2000), fear of dominance (Glazer 1986), and elite manipulation (Abdi Samatar 1997; Chandra 2004). The African continent has been a victim for political catastrophes, ethnic violence and experienced more than its fair share. If we look at the size of its population, it is over one billion out of the roughly seven billion people on the planet.

The next sub-sections discuss two most influential schools of thought that have rarely dominated the literature of Africa’s civil wars, the primordialism and the instrumentalism.


Primordialism

The Primordial tribal explanation of Africa’s armed conflicts is rested on genealogical divisions and ancient hatreds (Weir, 2012). These hatreds were old and deeply historically rooted (Esteban et al. 2012). Accordingly, ethnicity can be the primary cause of African’s armed conflicts. So Seleka and Anti-balaka conflict in the Central Republic of Africa is essentially defined in terms of religion; the black and white conflict in America is racial,

not religious, not linguistic; and the mass violence in South Sudan is tied to clannism not religious nor racial. Thus, all of these are examples of intensity of passion and violence derived by old-aged hatreds. However, this explanation has its critics.

Abdi Samatar (1997: P. 687) argues “ethnic strife is the outcome rather than the cause of social upheavals in the continent.” Likewise, Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000: P. 1) claim that “the relatively higher prevalence of war in Africa is not due to the ethno-linguistic fragmentation of its countries, but rather to higher levels of poverty, failed political institutions, and economic dependence on natural resources.” Furthermore, they empirically examine whether there is a correlation between ethnicity and the occurrence of civil wars in thirty-two African countries (see figure 1). Accordingly, they came out with a conclusion that was totally against the premises of primordialism in explaining Africa’s civil wars.

Figure 1: The relationship between ethnicity and war



Source: Osman 2007: P. 118

If ancient hatreds and genealogical divisions are so deep-rooted, and are the primary causes of Africa’s civil wars, the question is then: why do different tribes in Somalia have violent conflicts but those in Tanzania and Botswana do not? Differently, if hatred among Somali clan families was so deeply rooted why have the different tribes in Botswana and Ghana managed to have peace for the last three decades? It does not mean that the genealogical

divisions in Tanzania, Botswana and Ghana love each other and those in Somalia hate each other. That is not the reality because there is always some antagonism, but these do not necessarily cause mass violence or civil wars.

Therefore, ethnic variables are significantly related to conflict as long as there are political or economic prizes at stake. Can we actually show using theoretical and econometric methods that ethnic differences and ancient hatreds cause violent conflicts in Africa? That is the critical question for the primordialists to think about analytically.

Instrumentalism

This is another leading school of thought, which could be categorized as the instrumentalist approach, that focuses on the place of primordial identities in Africa's civil wars, in their associations with domestic political structures and the role of human agencies. While recognizing the existence of the so-called primordial features such as clannism, ethnic culture and religion, instrumentalists argue that these features on their own do not naturally result in mass violence (Omeje 2015: P. 11). Instrumentalist explanation of Africa's civil wars heavily relies on elite manipulation and economic factors. (Collier 2002; Collier & Hoeffler 2004). An instrumentalist follows a line of argument which suggests that the political elites mobilize the ethnic groups for their own political interests. In other words, ethnic-oriented political elites capitalize on the ethnic divisions for their private political gains.

According to this line of argument, innate variables like antagonism or ethnic identity are not the drivers of Africa's civil wars but what drives armed conflicts in Africa is the political or economic use of these variables. In addition, conflicts take place because the political elites strategically manipulate ethnicity for the sake of political or economic interests. (Chandra 2004). Conversely, there is evidence suggesting ethnic identity becomes very dangerous only when these genealogical divisions become associated with grievances among ethnic groups living within a single political system. This can become particularly dangerous, when one ethnic group that gains control of the state power is able

to use the state’s resources to improve their own position at the expense of other ethnic groups, this adds a very strong motivation for Africa’s conflict. (Glazer 1986).

One of the examples where we see these patterns of domination and discrimination leading to civil war is Somalia during the President Siad Barre’s regime, where few clans ruled over all other clans. The political elites may find ethnicity or clan identity useful for political mobilization, however, the critical question is why do civilians respond to the elites? It is very difficult to find solid evidence showing the link between the political or economic factors and civil wars in Africa. The instrumentalist explanation has its own weakness. Somalia’s civil war has been explained by many Somalia scholars through separate lenses of primordialism and instrumentalism. This chapter critically evaluates literature on Somalia’s civil war, as well as presents further evidence in support of its new explanation about the underlying causes of the Somali civil war. The chapter recognizes two major schools of thought which have dominated literature on Somalia’s civil war. These two theoretical approaches are summarized in Table 1.

Table 1: Comparison of the Primordialist and Instrumentalist Explanation

Characteristics	Primordialism	Instrumentalism
Unit of Analysis	Clan Identity	Political elites
Motivation	Grievance	Greed
Historical Roots	Old	New
The Main Claims	Clan rivalry, ancient hatreds and clan differences are the underlying causes of the Somali civil war.	Elite manipulation, the economic decline in the 1980s, competition for resources, the Ethio-Somali war and colonial legacy, state building and modernization process are the primary causes of the Somali civil war.

NOTE: Table 1 summarizes two main theoretical approaches to explain the Somali civil war, 1991-2006.

The Somali Civil War and Explanations in Literature

Somalia, like many other African countries, experienced civil war in the early 1990s. There has been a wide range of studies that existed from as far back as the 1980s and these studies offered explanations that attempted to contribute to our understanding of the Somali civil war. These explanations fall into three inter-relating categories: cultural, political and economic. (Kapteijns 2008). Each of these explanations has its basic assumptions that explain the root causes of the civil war. To understand the complexity of the Somali civil war, however, one must put it in the context of historical analysis to get a clear snapshot of violent local actors in the civil war (see Table 2).

Table 2 Contextualizing the Complexity of the Somali Civil War

Violent Actors	Local	Description
Armed Factions		Post-1991 era, clan-based political organizations including the Somali Salvation Democratic Front, the Somali National Movement, the United Somali Congress, and the Somali Patriotic Movement.
Subclan Militias		Clan-milias comprising pastoralists, warlord armed gangs, private security guards, armed youths, sharia court security forces.
Islamist Armed Groups		Islamist groups comprising Ras Kamboni Mujahidin, Jabhadda Islaamiga Soomaaliyeed, and the Khalid bin Walid group.

Source: Paul, C., Clarke, C., & Serena, C. 2014: P.157.

Primordialist Explanation

Primordialists argue that Somalia's civil war involved clannism and genealogical divisions among Somali clan families. Moreover, we heard from the media that there has been violent conflict in Somalia because clan X has clashed with clan Y. But the analytical question is why Somalia went into such a destructive civil war? Some scholars of Somalia have argued that the answer has its root in the nature of Somali clannism. As I. M. Lewis (1961) argues, it is presumed that ancient clan rivalries will result in conflict from time to time, as Somalis are inherently clannistic and therefore act in that manner. From this perspective, clannism has long been a social division generating resources, competition and power within and between Somali clan families.

I. M. Lewis (1961) claims that clannism is a part of the organic defining feature of Somali society and the Somali people have been clannistic and organized in clan groups hostile to each other. Said Samatar and David Laitin (1987) have come out with a similar argument and have supported Lewis's explanation about the correlation between the nature of the Somali* political life and the civil war in Somalia. However, the logic of this explanation is flawed and unable to offer a sufficient explanation of the Somali civil war. Conversely, clanship can be both unifying and divisive at the same time depending on how we use it. When the colonial powers have used clanship as a wedge to divide communities, it became a catastrophe, but when Somalis used it in the old way of kinship and families that share a lot of things together, it brought the Somali clan families together. In a positive way, clan in Somalia is a wonderful form of insurance. For example, if someone from Somalia arrives in any country in Europe or Africa, he will find that his clan's brothers and sisters will look after him.

Although I. M. Lewis explained the Somali civil war through primordialist lens, he failed to account for the historic and linguistic differences among Somali clan families. As Kusow (1994: P. 31) pointed out "Historians, Anthropologists, and successive Somali governments alike have failed to recognize the cultural, socioeconomic, and the ecological differences among the people." In contrast to I. M Lewis's claim of ancient hatred and clan rivalry among Somali clans as responsible factors for the Somali calamities, Kusow points that the historical differences among Somali clans and how they have manipulated their history are the underlying causes of the Somali civil war. Kusow (1994: P. 42) argues that "the civil war in Somalia is a direct result of both the long-suppressed historical, cultural, and ecological differences among the Somali clan families and how they have used history."

However, these explanations offered by Kusow and Lewis are weak because the clan differences and ancient hatreds or clan rivalry themselves do not reflect the cause of serious conflicts in Africa in general and in specific to Somalia. In other words, the cause is not the clan identity or difference, but it is the way that clan-oriented political elites politicize these factors for the sake of their political gains, so the conflict arises not from the clan

differences or ancient antagonism but from politicization clan identity instrumentalized for somebody's agenda by political elites. In this context, Somalia's civil war was in response to politicization of clan identity, deprivation of basic needs, state's repressive role and external linkages. Having many clan groups living together within a state does not necessarily mean that there must be a civil war, though some research has suggested that in some cases, it makes political violence more likely, particularly if there are antagonistic social relations between different clans that might lead to hostility. This paper argues that the involvement of clan-oriented political elites who try to use clan identity or ethnicity as an instrumental means to mobilize, solidify their own positions of state power.

The Communal Content Factor in Somalia

Clan factor in Somalia has played a strong part in social, economic, and political interactions, and has acted both as a social cohesion and a cause of tribal war. (Ssereo, 2003). For a long time, Somalis have dominated each other using clanship as the basis for advancing their interest in their political system. Every Somali belongs to a particular tribe, clan, sub-clan and household or family. In this context, clan is a dividing force and at the same time is a uniting force. (Osman 2007). Each clan group is responsible for its members and, therefore, the action of members will have an impact on the whole clan. In addition, belonging to a clan provides protection, access to water, land, and political power, as well as conflict resolution through traditional customary law. Stig J. Hansen, notes that clan groups in Somalia function as a support system for members, for example, during a drought, members rely on the clan for basic needs such as food security. (Hansen, S. J. 2003: P. 57). In addition, Catherine Besteman, points out that "clan membership also provides an identity within Somali society." (Besteman, Catherine 1993: P. 567).

Somali people as a nation share one language, one religion and common history, which makes them a unique ethnic group who inhabit a large area in the horn of Africa. Although Somali people belong to one ethnic group, they also belong to major clans such as: Daarod, Hawiye, Dir and Rahanweyn. Most Somalis belong to clans that are pastoralists and move constantly throughout the year in search of grazing land and water. (Abdullahi M. 2015: P. 2).

When it comes to thinking about the concept of clan in the Somali context, it has been characterized by two theoretical explanations, both of which will be examined below. The first explanation emphasizes clanship as the basic social foundation and the major and enduring code of the socio-political association of Somali society. From its perspective, the principle of clan structure has always been and remains the main determinant. I. M. Lewis introduced this theoretical explanation in the late 1950s, as he updated the structural functionalist approaches to social anthropology (Lewis 1961). As this modified structural-functional approach appears to have mostly survived in Somali studies, where I. M. Lewis half a millennium later is still defending it, I will name it the Lewisian approach. (Kapteijns 2004).

The second explanation holds that the Lewisian view over emphasises the importance of clan and that this overemphasis emerged in a very detailed historical context, namely, that of the late-colonial consensus between British rulers and Somali subjects documented by Lewis during his 1955–57 study. According to this second explanation, clanship is therefore not a fundamental and constant organizational and behavioral principle of Somali political life but a central principle of a particular and very influential way of thinking about Somali political life, a way of thinking with an extremely particular history and an evil influence in the present (Kapteijns 2004).

Most of the literature reviewed for this paper recognizes that, these major clan families indicated above, are believed to be family of Samaali. However, this paper argues that clans are not part of the problem, but when it gets politicized by clan-oriented political elites, it cultivates negative competition for economic resources, zero-sum attitude, security dilemma and clan based civil strife, as we have seen in Somalia. In the past, clan identity has played a unifying role in Somali society. It was a source of solidarity among tribesmen, creating a system of mutual assistance for the solution of daily problems among a clan member. Each clan had its respected leaders and elders, who enjoyed their clan members' trust and were vested with the authority to resolve disputes. The elders were also the representatives of the clan in any dialogue with other clan leaders, and in case of inter-clan

conflicts. The clan in Somalia's context was recognition of a person's identity and his genealogical lineage. It is an informal social institution in which actual or notional kinship is based on blood. Moreover, clan is an identity network consisting of an extensive web of horizontal and vertical kin-based relations. During the economic crises in the late 1980s, Siad Barre resorted to tribalistic techniques to maintain power. This method divided his enemies and logically intensified general awareness of clan membership. Siad Barre resorted to encouraging clan warfare in a number of ways - he organized raids; his troops armed the loyal clans and encouraged them to wage war against opposing clans. The harm caused by negative and destructive manipulation of clan identity was reflected in the incapability of the Somali people to rebound when Siad Barre was deprived from power in 1991. (Barbora Rýdlová 2007: P. 46).

Instrumentalist Explanation

Somalia's civil war has not resulted from genealogical divisions, ancient hatreds and clan rivalry among Somali clans, but these variables have been used by political elites to draw lines, to draw allegiance to create political power. Abdi Samatar and Ahmed Samatar are some of the leading scholars of Somalia, and both refused Lewis's explanation of the Somali civil war. That instead they looked at the civil war through instrumentalist lens.

Ahmed Samatar published several studies about the Somali civil war. Ahmed argued that, I. M. Lewis confused clanship relations with clannishness. (Ahmed Samatar 1988). Following Somalia's civil war, there have been many published books and articles which attempted to explain the reasons behind the civil war. The book by Ahmed Samatar and Terrence Lyons (1995: P. 100-104) argued that the underlying factors which are responsible for the Somali civil war are "the disintegration of political institutions and the resulting chaos and insecurity."

According to Abdi Samatar, the primordialist argument leads to the conclusion that Somalia's civil war is the nature of its culture, threaded in the clan system. Moreover, in the view of Abdi Samatar (1992: P. 629), the primordialist approach has four major failings: 1. it confuses kinship with clannism. 2. It accepts the ideology of clannism as reality. 3. It gives excessive weight to the causal power of clannism. 4. It treats a clan as a

static phenomenon. Menkhous (2003: P. 406) came out with a similar summary and noted that: The conventional wisdom on Somalia's crisis offers several explanations. They include charges 1. Somali leaders have been irresponsible and myopic in their quest for power and their stubborn refusal to compromise; 2 collective fear of the re-emergence of a predatory state undermines public support for peace-building; 3 the powerful centrifugal forces of Somali clansmen works against centralised authority, making quests to rebuild a Western-style state a fool's errand; neighbouring states such as Ethiopia conspire to perpetuate [the civil war] in Somalia for their own reasons; 4 external diplomacy has been consistently misinformed and incompetent in its mediation efforts.

The civil war in Somalia was widely caused by elite manipulation. As Abdi Samatar (1997: P. 688) argues that "The central actors responsible for the destruction of the Somali world order are the dominant elites." Accordingly, these dominant elites have been using clannishness as a tool of exploitation to advance their political interests.

Abdi Samatar blames the state elites for the destruction of the Somali world order for two reasons: First, the ruled elites had never tried to rationalize public sector management through what he called "the reinvention of the civil service commission." Secondly, President Siad Barre, who was the leader of the ruled elites, was the only decision maker of all vital decisions in public management. Furthermore, Abdi Samatar (1997: P. 705) argued that "...The Somali nightmare is not the result of genealogical divisions among the population but of the narrow accumulation strategies of the elites."

Similarly, Menkhaus (2003: P. 414) claims that "Somalia's crisis of state collapse, armed conflict, and lawlessness has endured because that is the outcome key players seek." According to him, these key players are warlords, businessmen, politicians or what he called "white colors." In addition, these elites or key players had power to obstruct any local efforts to impose the rule of law and revive the collapse of the central state. They were able to do through what Menkhaus has termed a "clever manipulation of clannism." However, this explanation failed to give much attention to the role played by the following factors: Politicization of clan identity, deprivation of basic needs, state's repressive role and external linkages.

By contrast, some scholars of Somalia have explained the Somali civil war in terms of inequality and economic factors. According to these scholars, the Somali civil war was a product of three interrelated problems: Inequality, economic decline, and availability of weapons. (Osman A. A. 2007; Elmi and Barise 2006). It has also been viewed that; these explanatory aspects are the product of the colonial legacy. However, the analytic question is how did the weapons become available to the public?

According to Osman, weapons became available because when the war between Somalia and Ethiopia ended in 1978, the country's economy began to deteriorate; as a result of this, the weapons became more accessible to the general public. This explanation fails to explain why the civil war broke out. Elmi and Barise (2006), argue that the Somali civil war was a result of resource competition or state power, the long-term brutality of the Siad Barre's military regime and the colonial legacy. Accordingly, the most important motivational factor which explains the Somali conflict is the competition for resources. This argument often refers to the Somali's pastoral life; the nomadic clans have always fought each other over grazing, water and livestock long before the country got independence. Conflicts among Somali clan families were relatively low until when they were notable in the pastoral life, where competition for grazing and water has resulted in violence and antagonism. However, Elmi and Barise have failed to address why masses or ordinary people armed up against the regime.

Elmi and Barise, have also argued that state repression by the military regime is the second cause of the Somali conflict. However, they failed to give a detailed description of how state repression led to the Somali civil war. According to the Theory of State Repression, the state's existence depends on nations giving their legitimacy. Therefore, repression is one of the instrumental means that the regime used to protect itself from political challenges. It should be noted that if one wants to understand the destruction of the Somali world order, one should explain it from the economic perspective rather than the cultural or sociological perspective. Mubarak (1996) argues that the regime's financial strategy; its reactions to the economic crisis in the late 1980s, has been harmful to national

development. As a result, the country's economy and the political condition have deteriorated which in turn led to a civil war.

Similarly, in his study "*Empty Bowl: Agrarian Political Economy in Transition and the Crises of Accumulation*," Abdi Samatar is the scholar that wrote in detail the economic forces that led to the failure of the state under Siad Barre rule. His conclusion includes the under accumulation of capital as well as the predatory state that was kept in power as a result of international military and economic development aid. ((Kapteijns 2008: P. 28). With the end of the Cold War, economic support reduced and the state collapsed. As Samatar noted that, unlike Botswana's hegemonic class, the Somali petty bourgeoisie was not united. Nor did it have disciplined leaderships who recognized the importance of bureaucratization in conjunction with systemic accumulation and the protection of the collective project. The disunity of the governing elite and the weakness and passivity of the rural population created such unstable and political weakness. This repressive state under Siad Barre rule was depended on and boosted by international supports. (Kapteijns 2008: P. 29).

In the language of realist, clan does not have any causal power and its effects on the Somalis political life are conditional rather than essential. As Abdi Samatar (1992: P. 631) argues, the search for the responsible factors in the outbreak of Somalia's civil war must begin by tracing the nature of the changes that had taken place in the social order rather than genealogical orders of the Somali society.

However, despite all these economic factors indicated above, Osman, Mubarak and Samatar failed to explain why the civil war broke out in 1991, but not during the economic crisis of the early 1980s. The civil war in Somalia has multiple causal forces and it has been drawn from political science, economics, anthropology, theology and more. As Samuel M. Makinda (1991: P. 118) argued that: The civil war has stemmed from a combination of various factors, including clan rivalries and differences, nepotism, corruption in high places, the uneven distribution of national resources and, above all, President Barre's dictatorial rule.

Somalia has been a stadium of clan warfare and experienced a catastrophic condition which ultimately led into disastrous and anarchy. Abdi Dirshe (2013) claims the conflict in Somalia has primarily resulted from the “colonial institutional legacy” and the presence of “neoliberal economic agenda.” However, this explanation fails to account the role played by other factors such as politicized clan identity, deterioration of basic needs, state’s repressive role, and external linkages.

The state under Siad Barre rule was authoritarian, and during his reign it was characterized by politicized clanistic policy, and clan manipulation, causing deterioration of basic needs, repression. Consequently, several clan rebel organizations armed up against this dictatorial regime. Thus, some scholars think that the outbreak of the civil war primarily resulted from the Barre’s dictatorial leadership. (Paul, C., Clarke, C., & Serena, C. 2014; Samuel M. Makinda 1991). The Somali people were living under their own indigenous political system called Somali traditional system before the colonial powers came into Somali lands and introduced modern political system. When the colonial powers came into Somali lands, they destroyed the traditional system and substituted it into the modern administration which was totally incompatible with the local cultural realities. This transformation has created a confusion and frustration among the Somali clan families. As a result, the country entered a protracted civil war.

In addition, the civil war resulted from the climax of a process which had started with the country’s declaration of independence in 1960. As Ssereo (2003) argues. the Westphalia model of the state which Somali has adapted after independence, the process of state building and modernization of Somalia are the underlying causes of the Somali civil war. Accordingly, if we want to understand Somalia’s political crisis, we need to look back at the process of decolonization and the formation of the first and second republic of Somalia. To sum up, this paper argues the Somali civil war needs to be understood as mainly political. Therefore, the paper does not stand on the position of the classical clan readings and instrumentalism but stands on the middle. In other words, it will use some elements from the Primordialism and Instrumentalism to come up with a combined explanation of the Somali civil war.

Instead of siding with either of these two dominant schools of thought, the paper argues that Somalia’s civil war was a result of a combination of inter-related factors: Politicization of clan identity, deprivation of basic needs, state’s depressive role and international linkages. These inter-related factors are summarized in table 3. These causal factors not only caused Somalis against the Siad Barre regime but also Somalis against Somalis, which latter ended in civil war.

Table 3: The Causal Forces of Somalia’s Civil War

Preconditions	Correlates
Clan	Politicization
Human needs	Deprivation of basic need
State’s role	Scales of political repressions
International linkages	Military aid

Many scholars of Somalia have been putting much effort on the explanation of the civil war in Somalia by focusing on the genesis but overlooked these explanatory variables of the civil war. However, chapter three will analyze these overlooked explanatory aspects of Somalia’s civil war and aimed to fill the analytical gap by finding out the missing literature on the Somali civil war.

Theoretical Analysis

This paper analyzes Edward Azar’s Theory of Protracted Social Conflict for Somalia’s civil war case. The civil war can be explained by the help of what Edward Azar observed as “preconditions of protracted social conflict.” According to Edward Azar’s PSC Theory, these preconditions are deprivation of basic needs, the bad governance and state’s repressive role and international Linkages. Thus, the main theoretical concepts used in this chapter will derive from the Edward Azar’s preconditions of the protracted social conflict.

Table 4: Preconditions for Pscs

Preconditions for PSCs	Correlates
Communal content	Degree of ethnic heterogeneity
Needs	Levels of human development
Governance	Scales of political repression
International Linkage	Volume of arms imports, economic aid, etc.

Source: Internal Analysis

In his book, *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases*, Edward Azar defines protracted social conflict as “prolonged and often violent struggle by communal groups for such basic needs as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation.” It generally understands that the hostile interaction between different clans resulted from a deep-seated ancient hatred that persisted over time with killing each other over water, land and grass.

The Protracted Social Conflict Theory is selected because of its unique form of social conflict. It recognizes the fundamental contributing variables of the Somali civil war. In addition, the civil war case in Somalia is a good example to understand the nature of violent conflict in the theory of protracted social conflict. Put it another way, some variables in the Somali civil war are vital to understand the conceptual preconditions of protracted social conflict. While there have been many efforts to develop theoretical explanations of the Somali civil war, no work has been done to explain it through Edward Azar’s Theory of Protracted Social Conflict. Thus, this paper strives to find out the self-explanatory forces of the Somali civil war, a better understanding of underlying causes of the civil war.

It must be noted that, this chapter does not concern about the reasons behind the longevity of the Somali conflict rather it analyzes the nature of the Somali civil war. In doing so, the paper strives to answer one of the fundamental questions about the genesis of the Somali civil war. How does politicized clan identity factor explain the Somali civil war? In answer to this question, the paper adopts Edward Azar’s Theory of Protracted Social Conflict which explains the genesis of the Somali civil war.

Deprivation of Basic Needs

PSC Theory views deprivation of basic needs as a subjective characteristic that occurs when a [clan] does not receive what they think they have the right to receive. This leads to frustration that motivates political violence. This happened in the case of clan-based political organizations during the reign of President Siad Barre; as a result, grieved clan rebel organizations with frustration over basic needs were armed up against his dictatorial regime.

In early 1991, the military regime ended, and Somalia entered a protracted civil war. Some scholars argue that the civil war resulted from a combination of several factors-domestic and external. At the domestic level, many years of continued frustration over basic needs led to social unrest. In the 1980s, the underlying problems in Somalia were food shortage together with state's repression, lack of acceptance, security and fair access to political and economic institutions. In short, it is the deprivation of people's needs.

According to Thomas and Mazrui (1992), people tend to arm up themselves when their rights are violated, and their basic needs are not fulfilled by the government. Such unfulfilled basic needs were experienced by Somalia in the late 1980s. In his memoir, *The Road to Zero*, Mohamed Osman Omar, who served under the regime in various ambassadorial posts, provided his reflections on the deprivation of basic needs in Somalia: While the masses were suffering greatly, the ruling elite and the members of the upper stratum of the population were leading an extravagant, luxurious life. They had everything in abundance. Water and diesel were scarce commodities for the common man, but the tanks of the rich were always full. The women in high society competed to acquire the newest model of car to add to the collection in their garages. Possession of a Landcruiser was a special status symbol for those families who were members of the ruling clan. It is well-known that ...Siad Barre played one clan against the other to rule overall. Regime's repression against its people disrupted food production and distribution. Between 1980 and 1989, food shortages appeared, and local food prices doubled. Moreover, in the late 1989, hundreds of Somalis were at risk of malnutrition and starvation. By 1990s, the situation had become hopeless, and Somalis were suffering.

It can be argued that the regime under President Siad Barre developed a state-centric security rather than a human centric-security policy and led the country into deprivation of human needs. Frustration over basic needs often breeds social unrest which led to a civil war. As Edward Azar (1990: P. 9) stated that “Grievances resulting from need deprivation are usually expressed collectively; failure to redress these grievances by the State cultivates a niche for social conflict.”

According to PSC Theory, access to political and social institutions are the key determinant factors for satisfying a clan group’s needs. Furthermore, it claims “Such denial fosters greater cohesion within victimized communal groups and may work to promote collective violence...if no other means of satisfaction is available.” (E. Azar 1990: P. 9-10). If these basic needs are denied by the state or the ruling clan, then these become collective grievances for future civil war. Consider the example of Somalia in the 1980s and in the late 1990s, the majority clans in the country were denied access to political institutions based on their clan identities.

Somalia was created out of the colonial nightmare, however in most cases the country is not positioned to supply the basic needs. This is primarily what we saw in Somalia before the civil war in 1991. Moreover, one of the reasons for the escalations of the armed clan-backed opposition groups against the military regime in post-ogaden war was frustration over basic needs coupled with insecurity and injustice. As Ssereo (2003: P. 28) noted that: Children could not go to school because education was not free; the sick could not be cared for sufficiently because there were no facilities; populations from famine affected areas could not be fed because there was not enough food in spite of the provisions made by international humanitarian [organizations]; ...social and political aspirations could not be achieved because the political framework was not democratic. President Siad Bare was an illegal dictator and his military forces committed atrocities in Somalia, they slaughtered hundreds of innocent people and therefore, the country’s economy deteriorated and Somalis, particularly the young people suffered. As Samuel M. Makinda (1991: P. 118)

noted that “[the civil war] has also maimed the young and able-bodied persons and thereby denied the society some potential labour.”

State’s Repressive Role

According to PSC Theory, political authority is usually controlled by a hegemonic clan group or a dominant clan. These hegemonic clan groups or dominant clan limited access to social institutions by other [clans]... created crisis of legitimacy. (E. Azar 1990: P. 10). Nevertheless, this variable is related to the role played by the state in the game of bad governance and repression. Edward Azar argues that “Most states which experience protracted social conflict tend to be characterized by incompetent, parochial, fragile and authoritarian government that fails to satisfy basic human needs.” (E. Azar 1990: P. 11). Between 1969 and 1990s, Somalia was ruled by an authoritarian government characterized by incompetent leadership, clannistic in nature and fragile. As the following statement by Ingiriis (2016: P. 2) indicated that: Siad Barre’s seizure of power followed by an ‘absolutist authoritarian rule’—led the unified Somali State—as we knew it—to a state of statelessness. ...The [regime] was preoccupied from the beginning with promulgating draconian legislations to impose new authoritarian rules and regulations.

The authority relied on coercion rather than on fair competition between the various non-state forces, in other words, the various clans found within society. The regime weakened in the late 1980s, as the external linkage with Russia ended due to the diplomatic controversy. As a result of this, the regime was prone to a civil war. In addition to repression, the Presidential armed guards of the regime continued to harass the people, indulging in criminal acts of robbery and killing of civilians. Mass violence gradually engulfed the entire country (Ingiriis 2016).

President Siad Barre established a governance system which was based on clan-patronage and connections. This system led to the spread of corruption and bribery in the public offices. As Ingiriis (2016) observed that through a combination of corrupt practices and exhortation, the only people who had big money in those days turned out to be President Siad Barre’s clan-oriented politicians.

Similarly, I M Lewis observed the repressive role of Siad Barre's regime, and its growing reliance on hard power rather than soft. In addition, all means of communications in the country were under President Siad Barre's clansmen, the oppressed clans began to resist. In this context, repressive and discrimination was severely institutionalized. (Ingiriis, 2016). The state under President Siad Barre rule used discriminate killing, burning of villages and torture as an instrument of control. (Elmi & Barise 2006: P. 33). When the military regime took power in 1969, it made the situation worse.

The military regime's political and economic discrimination against its own people had been a regular incident since the early post-independence years and rose to clan-related state terrorism against the northern clans. Also, in terms of distribution of development aid and state investment, the oppressed clans, particularly the Hawiye and Isaaq clans felt extremely neglected. State spending on infrastructure was lower than those in colonial times. In 1986, when the government was under Siad Barre rule, economic policies became clannish, the attacks were directed against both northern and southern clans who dominated the two major centers of private trade. As the state provided security mainly to those clans who were part of the government, it was mainly these named clans who were victims of Siad Barre exclusivist policy. (Barbora Rýdlová 2007: P. 47).

According to Elmi and Barise, state repression was the second major factor which explains the Somali civil war. Accordingly, in 1978, when some military officers attempted to oust the regime, the military regime used the national army forces to penalize civilian members of the eastern clan. The Military regime subsequently was involved in the killing of civilians and committed atrocities against its own people. (Elmi and Barise 2006: P. 35).

International Linkages

The fourth variable is the complicated external linkages. Edward Azar (1990: P. 11) stated that "The role of the state in preventing Protracted Social Conflict by... Satisfying basic needs is not determined solely by endogenous factors." He added that "the role of the state authority is greatly influenced by the linkage of the international actors." The economic and military relations of Somalia with international powers, namely Russia and United States of America, explained as one of the self-explanatory factors for the Somali civil war.

Russia sponsored economic and military aid to Somalia which in turn made the regime more dependent on external powers for survival. There is a Somali proverb which draws the Siad Barre regime's linkage with external actors, "Either be a mountain or have a mountain to lean on." Obviously, "Russia was the mountain for the regime to lean on for its survival." (Ingiriis 2016: P. 169). When Siad Barre came to power in 1969 through military coup, he cut off political relations with USA, and took steps to strengthen relations with Russia. Since the coup, there has been a patron-client relationship between Somalia and Russia. This relation deepened in late 1974, when Somalia signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Russia. As a result, Russia provided massive military aid to its new comrade Somalia. As Ingiriis (2016: P. 85) pointed out that: The Soviet Union sent massive arsenal and hardware as military assistance to the military regime, providing 150 T-35 and 100 T-54 tanks, fitted with 105mm guns, 50 MiG 16 (later added MiG 16 and 21) fighter jets, 200 coastal batteries, Il-28 bombers, 300 armed carriers and SA-2 ground-to-air missiles. The military aid increased each subsequent year and cemented a strong client-patron relationship to such an extent that Somalia was supposed to be ever dependent on the Soviet Union for generations to come.

In the late 1980s, Somalia secured United State support. Hence, US gave substantial economic assistance but gave it little military aid. Similarly, Italy, a former colonial power was the only European country that has consistently maintained strong relations with Somalia. However, an important point of the international linkages in Somalia is when the relationship between Somalia and Russia became weak. As a result, the country was both economically and militarily ruined. Put it another way, there was a chance for clan rebellion movements to arms up against the regime. I. M. Lewis (1988: P. 260) observed that "Following the Ogaden war, as we have seen Somalia's primarily arms dependence on [Russia] had been replaced by more generalised aid dependence on the United States, the EEC and OPEC countries."

To sum up, military aid mainly from the sources named have played a key role as self-explanatory aspects on the demise of the Siad Barre's legitimacy rule and the civil war. Moreover, global political dynamics such as the cold war between USA and Russia had

their impact on political developments in Somalia as the weak state was given means to secure its existence (Barbora Rýdlová 2007: P. 78).

Politicized Clans in Communal Content

In his book, *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases*, Edward Azar identified basic variables as preconditions for the protracted social conflict. Politicized clan identity in multi-communal society, this paper considers as the most critical factor in Africa's civil wars. This supported Edward Azar's assertion "If a society characterized by multi-communal composition... conflict is most likely to arise." (Edward Azar 1990: 7).

According to PSC Theory, the state is usually dominated by a single clan or a coalition of few clans that are unresponsive to the needs of the other clans in the society [clan-based civil war]. Accordingly, people in the multi-communal countries give primarily loyalty to their clan identities rather than to the whole nation living in the country. Politicized clan group in the communal content means "A generic reference" to politicized clan identity group whose members share a common ancestor, religion, linguistic and other cultural features. However, the core problem comes when the relationship between the state and clan groups become distrustful, in other words, what Edward Azar called "the articulation between the states and society as a whole." As Edward Azar (E. Azar 1990: 7) stated that: Multi-communal societies are characterized by disarticulation between the state and society, with the state usually dominated by a single communal group or a coalition of a few communal groups that are unresponsive to the needs of other clan groups.

Somalia has experienced twenty-one-years history of dictatorial leadership, clan favoritism and clan dominance rule during the reign of President Siad Barre (1969-1990). It resulted from when Marehan (President Siad Barre's clan) became the only clan that was able to steer the wheel of the state resources and power for their favour at the expense of other clan groups. (Ingiriis 2016). In addition, politicization of clan identity was fed into Said Barre's regime politics and became even more dangerous. As a result, clan-based political

affiliations along with politicized clan lines armed up against Siad Barre's dictatorial regime. The ruling clans, known by the code-name MOD (Marehan, Ogaden and Dulbahante) controlled the key executive positions and the security forces, which in turn cultivated anger and grievances among oppressed clans and have fuelled a clan warfare that persisted until 2006. Somalia is a country characterized by a multi-clan composition. The identity profile of the country is complex. According to data in the World Factbook, the main ethnic divisions are: "Somali 85%, Bantu and other non-Somali 15% (including 30,000 Arabs)." (World Factbook 2018). The country also has genealogical divisions with a deep historical root that goes back pre-colonial era. Pre-colonial Somali society was divided into several autonomous clan groups that shared similar cultural traditions. Nevertheless, this paper recognizes that clan identity groups in the communal content are crucial factor shaping the Somali society, however, it argues that clan identity is not necessarily the cause of the Somali problem in general and particular in the outbreak of the Somali civil war.

Conclusion

The paper aimed to explain the underlying causes of the Somali civil war. The Paper analyzed the civil war with the help of Edward Azar's theoretical framework of "Protracted Social Conflict." The genesis of the civil war in Somalia was explored theoretically, based on a qualitative analysis of the literature review. The paper argued that clan itself or genealogical divisions of the Somali clan families were not responsible for Somalia's civil war, it was the politicization of clan identity, deprivation of basic needs, state's repressive role and external linkages.

Primordialists claimed that the Somali civil war involved clan rivalry and genealogical divisions among Somali clan families. Instrumentalists, on the other hand, argued that the civil war in Somalia did not result from genealogical divisions and ancient hatred or clan rivalry among Somali clans, but these variables have been used by political elites to draw lines, to draw allegiance in order to create political power. However, this paper argued that both explanations have failed to capture the role played by the politicized clan identity.

Having examined the role played by the politicized clan identity, findings showed that when clan identity gets politicized or put it in the context of struggle over state power, it produces clan-based civil war or political violence. Moreover, based on the examination of the politicization of clan identity in the Somali civil war, it was found that clan identity was deployed as a political resource in relation to social development, particularly used as an instrumental means of mobilization to fight for state power. It was also revealed that the state under Siad Barre rule is usually dominated by a single clan or a coalition of few clans that are unresponsive to the needs of the other clans in the society, which later cultivated clan-based civil strife.

Based on these theoretical reviews, the paper used the preconditions of the protracted social conflict as a means to identify the explanatory aspects of the civil war. According to the PSC Theory: Deprivation of basic needs, state's repressive role and international linkages suggested that these factors are the necessary underlying causes, proven to be sufficient conditions for Somalia's civil war.

Ultimately, the author of this paper admits that this research study does not cover every issue and aspects of Somalia's civil war; however, it suggests further field research on this topic from a broader perspective which investigates the role of politicization of communal content, deprivation of basic needs and external linkages on the Somali conflict in general. More importantly, further research would help to understand how politicization of clanship can explain both Somalia's protracted conflict and other social conflicts in Africa.

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