

Challenges of Somali State Building

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Abstract

The Somali state encountered tremendous challenges that overwhelmed its capacity as a state under formation. The multifaceted challenges, including political and socio-economic issues, have hindered the state-building endeavors and formed a strong barrier to the progress and development of the state's growth. The division of the Somali political elite horizontally (tribally) and their inability to manage political competition and demonstrate behaviours that correspond to the values of the modern state have led to the loss of priorities in national issues and the spread of corruption in all state apparatus, which paralyzed the entire state's movement. Political tribalism is manifested in its clearest form in the dilemma of reconciling political party necessities and tribal representation, a culture which prevails until today. The hollow discourse that failed to find a way of reconciling national slogans with the requirements of tribalism represented a big dilemma. The contradiction emerged during and after elections; politicians utilized national discourse during election campaigns, while tribalism came to the surface after the elections ended, particularly in times of power and resource sharing. Also, regional conflicts represented a challenge to the nascent institutions as the country engaged in armed conflict which was beyond its military and economic capacity. One factor that prompted the regional conflict was the Cold War and the superpowers' scramble for influence in the region.

Keywords: *state building, encountered apparatus, Cold War, developing countries, discourse, political, tribalism, socio-economic.*

Introduction

The emergence of the Somali state was linked to special circumstances and political, economic and social factors, which produced a special kind of state that does not enjoy full land and a divided people and it has no recognized international borders. After thirty years of independence and two successive regimes (civilian 1960-1969) and military (1969-1991), the Somali state collapsed completely, sparking widespread debate among Somali and non-Somali intellectuals about the causes of the collapse. Despite the diversity of opinions and ideas about the causes of the resounding fall of the Somali state, many of them ignored or did not at least mention the structural imbalance of the Somali state and its establishment, which did not grow and develop naturally, and the nature of the Somali leadership that took power after the departure of colonialism. The institutions that

colonialism left and handed over to the Somalis did not take the evolutionary trend, but rather fell into decline and stagnation.

While the West established the features of the national state in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, African countries began to establish the state only after independence, which contributed to the establishment of problems in building and forming the state. In addition, despite the development of the functions of the state in the world, as it moved from the guardian state in security and stability to the servant state that provides health, educational and economic services to society, the post-colonial state in Africa, including the Somali state, is no longer a guardian or servant of society. Amidst many challenges, that includes; abnormal birth and exposure to international tensions from west to east, preoccupation of the Somali leadership with issues that it does not have the ability to solve (Greater Somalia), the difficulties faced by the nascent state in achieving national integration between the two regions that formed the Somali state (north and south), lack of economic resources to cover its needs, being surrounded with hostile countries (Ethiopia, France and Britain) during independence, the Somali leadership, chose to struggle with the great powers.

Achieving the unity of Greater Somalia was a legitimate dream of Somali leaders and people, but at the same time it was a distant dream because of the rules and systems surrounding it, and it was not associated with deliberate projects and long-term planning, but rather its wisdom with passion and miscalculation. In addition, the Somali ambition to restore the lost lands contributed to leading the state towards falling into the trap of the Cold War, making it one of its largest bloody theaters.

As a result, this situation has had negative repercussions on the Somali state at the internal and regional levels, and the inability of Somali political leaders to build a real state has emerged. In the light of the failure to confront these challenges, tribal conflicts erupted and later armed fronts supported from abroad developed, deteriorating economic performance, lack of political stability, widespread corruption and the accumulation of problems, which forced the Somali state to fall into more political, economic and social challenges. The fall

of the Somali state in the abyss in which it fell was the beginning of the warp that coincided with independence, and the state is affected in its construction by the society from which it is born and also expresses the level of elites and civilizes the behavior of the citizen. The Somali state was affected in its construction by two legacies, one of which is the Somali tribal pastoral society and the consequences of the colonial state. In the end, the ceiling has collapsed on everyone and the Somali people, during thirty years of civil war and instability, are still struggling to restore their state with sound foundations that are able to withstand changes, and to establish a social contract for the nation and constitutions governing the new state.

On this basis, the researcher aims through the paper to track the challenges faced by the Somali state-building process.

1960 is the year of exploitation and it is also the year of zero, the year everything will start all over again, everything must be done," says the Italian Journalist who accompanied Exploitation Day.

Did the Somali political elite understand what the Italian Journalist understood??????

Challenges of Somali State Building

This research was part of a master's thesis submitted by the researcher to obtain a master's degree at the University of Mogadishu and received the first degree of excellence with the title "(the Somali State-Factors of construction and collapse). This chapter deals with the challenges faced in the process of building of the Somali state during the three decades, the management of the rule, and the burden of the new and fragile state whose return was not strong. These challenges are divided into political, economic and social challenges, and internal and external challenges, some of which emerged in the search for the state itself or were born with the state and have roots in the colonial era that lasted for nearly a century, and others that arose after the establishment of the state and were linked to the conditions of management of the state affairs and the Somali state's dealings with international parties.

The chapter is divided into three sections

The first section deals with political challenges, which in turn are divided into internal political challenges that arose from the practice of the ruling elite of internal politics and its interaction with the internal component that arises from the interaction of the elite among themselves and between them and the Somali people, and external challenges that arose in the political interaction between the Somali state and the international community. These include internal challenges related to the administration of the state and the divisions of the political elite and their failure to manage political competition among themselves peacefully and on sound bases, and the failure to establish a correct order of priorities for national issues and reform of the administrative apparatus of the state, and political tribalism. As for the external challenges, the most important of them are: the regional conflict with neighboring countries over the lost territories, the identification in the Cold War, and the miscalculation and understanding of international politics.

The second topic deals with economic challenges, which in turn emerged with the emergence of the state, where the most prominent talk since the emergence of the idea of independence for Somalia was how to solve the economic dilemma, and the most prominent question for that period was: the possibility of adequate and permanent financial resources for the Somali state in the event of independence. These challenges include all economic areas, including the development and implementation of economic development plans, the permanent deficit in the public budget, the inability of the state to pay salaries, the deficit in the trade balance, the diversification of the economy's sources, and dependence on foreign aid, in addition to the periodic natural disasters that were destroying the fragile Somali economy, including the repeated droughts that caused the death of animals, the destruction of the agricultural crop, and then the famine that hit the majority of Somalia's nomadic population dependent on grazing in the country, and floods in the rainy seasons.

The third and final topic reviews the **social challenges** that faced Somali society after gaining independence and establishing the state. Among those challenges that the Somali people suffered from and affected their unity and state-building are: tribal conflict, identity

problems, the challenge of national integration, and large waves of migration from the countryside to the capital and major cities. These challenges include problems related to the community's relationship with the state, others related to interrelationships in Somali society, and a third related to the relationship of Somali society with the Arab and African regional environment.

Together, these political, economic and social challenges hampered the building of Somali society, the building of the state, the development of the relationship of society with the state itself, and the relationship of the Somali state and society with the regional and international environment. The ruling elite failed to understand these challenges and understand the nature of the state and Somali society and then limit the effects of these challenges on the short march of the state, which was unable to overcome its third decade since the Somalis took control of the state in their state in 1960 until the beginning of 1991.

The first topic - Political Challenges

The political challenges faced by the Somali state during its three decades of existence, and the inability of the Somali leadership to overcome them - are among the biggest factors that led to its collapse. These political challenges are divided into internal and external challenges. Internal challenges include: the challenge of state administration represented in the division of the political elite and its failure to manage political competition among themselves peacefully and on sound bases, failure to establish a correct order of priorities for national issues, failure to reform the administrative apparatus of the state, and political tribalism. As for the external challenges, the most important of them are: the regional conflict with neighboring countries over the lost territories, the identification in the Cold War, and the miscalculation and understanding of international politics.

Internal challenges

Among those challenges and problems associated with the administration of the Somali state, especially during the civilian rule (1960-1969), are the following:

(a) Division of the Somali political elite

Emerging from the emergence of the modern Somali national movement in the early 1940s, its roots deepened during the international tutelage phase when the country was being prepared for independence. The traditional leadership of the Somali people in the pre-colonial period was led by tribal Sheikhs and Sharia scholars. But after nearly a century of colonization, a modern elite emerged, as a result of the modern education brought by colonialism and the employment opportunities in the administrative and military apparatus of the colonial authorities. In addition to the graduates of modern education established by Egyptian charities and schools established since the early 1950s, a new elite emerged that took the leadership position of the Somali national movement and the state later. Four other types of elites emerged, represented by traditional elites consisting of tribal sheikhs and traditional Sharia scholars, and modern elites consisting of non-Islamists influenced by the West and Islamists.

The Somali orientation towards the Soviet Union and the sending of thousands of military personnel and civilians on educational missions to it added a radical dimension in the midst of the modern Western-cultured elite. Al-Khubba's interests were linked to provoking tribal conflicts in order to punish, weaken, or maneuver a rival.⁷¹ Mobilizing the tribe and effectively manipulating its sentiments is one of the tools of the Somali political elite. The fabrication of conflicts between the state and the tribe at times and between Islam and the state at other times was one of the tools of the political elite to control the rule.

The interactions of Islam, the tribes, and the state were among the issues that most hindered the unity of Somali leadership, and their repercussions continue today⁷².

(b) Managing the political competition among the elite

In addition to the cultural division that hindered the growth of a unified nationalist orientation of the elite in the state administration, the political elite failed to manage the political competition among themselves. Political parties were polarized on the street

⁷¹-Kenmankhous, Elitebargainsand Political Deals project Somalia, case study, page 11

⁷²() AbdurahmanAbdullahi (Baadiyow), Op. Cit. P. 82.

during the elections and on national issues. In many of their political positions, the elite crossed red lines and continued to enter the electoral battle as if it were a battle of life and death. There were also behaviors of disrespecting the constitution, laws and mechanisms of the democratic game that were new to the Somalis, especially after the responsibility of managing the state came in the hands of the Somalis without the presence of Italy, Great Britain or the United Nations. It was not surprising that such behaviors occurred in a country that was new to freedoms and suffered a lot from enslavement and tyranny under various colonial regimes, including the Italian fascist regime. Former Somali President Adam Abdullahi Othman was one of the prominent figures who were famous for wisdom and guidance of the political elite and the general public, and he said in this regard that "strengthening our country's democracy means that everyone respects the system and laws we have set for ourselves, that we love each other, and that we resolve our differences in a peaceful and friendly manner⁷³."

One of the most prominent examples in which these behaviors emerged was the referendum on the constitution that took place in 1961, where some prominent figures sought to persuade voters to vote, not because they objected to the provisions of the constitution, but rather their rejection of the government that was formed and that conducted the constitution process, hoping that the rejection of the constitution would lead to the overthrow of the government and the formation of a new government. The elite also showed abnormal behaviors, including lack of complacency in the policies and principles of the parties to which they belong, the transformation of the loyalties of members of parliament motivated by the tribe or greed to obtain a political position from the government,⁽⁷⁴⁾ the use of party affiliation as a means of winning and obtaining the seat and joining the majority party after guaranteeing the seat, and the difference of voting for one deputy in one case when the type of voting varies from public to secret ballot or vice versa⁽⁷⁵⁾.

⁷³() Abdi Ismail Samater, *Africa's First democrats*, Op. Cit. P. 96.

⁷⁴() Mukhtar, Mohammed Haji: *the Emergence and Role of Political Parties in the Inter-River Region of Somalia*, Op. Cit. P. 84.

⁷⁵() Abdi Ismail Samater, *Africa's First democrats*, Op. Cit. P. 171.

Among the difficulties and challenges associated with the administration of the Somali state, which emerged from the very beginning of the birth of the Somali state, is the obstruction of the granting of confidence to the government in the parliament, due to the desire of various parliamentary groups that the government - despite the limited ministerial portfolios - reflect the political spectrum of the party, including the opposition parties, and the quest of prominent figures belonging to various parties to assume a position in the government, and the adoption of the right to grant confidence to the government in the parliament as a means of pressuring the President and the majority party to obtain positions in it. This problem was faced by the first and second governments of Abdul Rashid and the first and second governments of Abdul Razzaq⁷⁶.

The opposition to the formation of successive governments during civilian rule and the lack of confidence in them was not only specific to the opposition parties, but the ruling party itself had difficulty convincing its members to vote for the government formed by the party itself, unless the member guaranteed his position from the government in advance, and the members of the parties had no real value or loyalty to the party to which they belonged as much as they were interested in the position they held in the government.

This problem still affects the course of the Somali state. Do the tribes take their shares in tribal quotas or in political parties? How can they be reconciled?

(C) Administrative integration between the British and Italian systems:

This is one of the biggest challenges faced by the Somali state after the independence of the British Northern Territories on June 26, 1960 and the Italian Southern Territory on July 1, 1960. Integration of the two territories after more than 70 years of living under two different colonial administrations was very challenging. It was a thorny issue that preoccupied the political elite in the early years of the Republic, because this issue required the unification of different laws, legislation and regulations, the integration of state

⁷⁶ Hamdi Al-Sayed Salem, op. Cit., P.

institutions at different levels into the new constitution prepared in the first year after independence, and the translation of the integration process into reality after that.

The biggest challenge lay in the length of the different colonial era in which the two regions lived with two different systems. These included the difference in culture, the language of administration, education, institutions, laws, and even in the thinking and orientations of the political elites, with the northern region not having a sufficient period of preparation for independence and unity as compared to what happened in the south.⁽⁷⁷⁾ The lack of financial capabilities and technical expertise of the young state, and the weak infrastructure in transportation and communications that links the state center in the capital with the remote governorates, including the capital of the northern region, which is about one thousand and five hundred kilometers away from the center, slowed the pace of integration and hindered the process of interaction with the new state, in addition to the administrative centralization adopted by the new state, which made citizens feel the shadow of the state - especially in the remote northern governorates - dim.

The issue of integration between the two regions was the most important issue after independence, and it was a time bomb left by colonialism after the issue of disputed borders and lost lands. The United Nations formed an international body headed by United Nations expert Paolo Contini in 1960 to prepare the gradual integration and reconcile the disparities that hinder unity⁷⁸, but it did not succeed in its work.

(d) Appropriate prioritization of national issues

The Somali political elite in general - both in the civil and military era - failed to understand the hierarchy of priorities for the pressing national issues that awaited the emerging government, which was burdened with the serious challenges that were born with it, to be an effective and viable government and to achieve the most basic needs of Somali citizens

⁷⁷() At the London Conference on March 2-12, 1960, it was announced that the independence of northern Somalia would be June 26, 1960, two months before independence.

⁷⁸ Harold D. Nelson, Somalia, A country Study, P. 53

whose expectations of statehood were high. It is the successful leadership of states that sets the right priorities⁷⁹ for national issues. Among those pressing issues for building the Somali state at the internal level were the completion of the building of state institutions, unifying the Somali people, completing administrative, cultural and political integration between the northern and southern regions, achieving economic development, providing job opportunities, reducing dependence on foreign aid, and developing the country's infrastructure, where the state's area is large, density is low and roads are non-existent. The state was finding it difficult to reach the provinces, and the travel from Hargeisa, the capital of the northern region, to Mogadishu took a week.

Instead of focusing on the process of building a state capable of carrying out its main function of providing security, providing services and establishing infrastructure, the political elite made it a priority to wage conflict with neighboring countries to recover lost lands, seek foreign aid, especially for weapons from the east and the west, and build the army, which carried more political and economic burdens on the young state. During the civilian rule that continued in the first decade after independence, the political elite was preoccupied with side issues and was preoccupied with the intense competition among them. History records some strange incidents that were fought over from the early age of the state, including the issue of the conflict between President Adam Abdullah Osman and members of parliament over a draft law to increase the salaries of deputies.

The president opposed this while deputy supported and took the approval of this law as a condition for the passage of the government of Abdul Razzaq in Parliament. Deputies were able to pass the draft by a simple majority, but the President used the veto to prevent the passage of the law, and returned the draft to the Parliament, which needed a two-thirds majority to bypass the president's veto, which he could not. The President finally won over

⁷⁹There was no Somali doctor, pharmacist, engineer or secondary teacher in Somalia at the time. See History of Somalia, p. 247.

the deputies, and it was based on his rejection of the idea of the economic situation of the country and the floods that swept the southern governorates⁸⁰ in that period.

In the early years of the government, the military regime led by Siad Barre made attempts to rearrange the ladder of priorities. Despite its focus on building military power and relying on the Soviet Union, it made attempts to achieve some of the main functions of the state, including providing job opportunities, improving education services (writing the Somali language) and health, to respond to the aspirations of the people that were not achieved in the hands of the civilian elite, in order to gain the legitimacy and support it needed, and consolidate its feet as the government. But the political tension that began after the execution of some political leaders on charges of plotting the coup, as well as the religious leaders who objected to the personal status laws that were contrary to the provisions of the Qur'an, and then the repercussions of Somalia's defeat in the war with Ethiopia and the striking of civil peace among the Somali people, all these developments have put those attempts in the wind.

(e) Reform of the administrative apparatus of the State

It is one of the internal challenges associated with the administration of the Somali state. The administrative apparatus of the colonial era performed the simple functions that the colonial administration needed, and they were translators, soldiers, clerks, judges, and tribal elders. The modern Somali administrative apparatus was established during the period of international trusteeship in the period between 1950-1960, in the south, especially after the launch of the policy of Somalization in 1954. This policy, which was implemented by the Italian administration, was accompanied by a number of problems, including: the lack of necessary training for the members of the apparatus due to the lack of a budget allocated for this, the financial corruption carried out by the administration, the limited time period for preparation, and the urgency with which the process was carried out, which was in a race against time to complete the program before the date of independence. In the north, similar opportunities to prepare for independence were not available.

⁸⁰ Abdi Ismail Samater, *Africa's First democrats*, Op. Cit. P. 108-109.

At the moment of its independence, the Somali state inherited an administrative apparatus that suffered from those problems mentioned earlier, which required radical reform and qualitative development. But instead, national civilian governments continued to expand the size of the apparatus in the first years after independence beyond its absorptive capacity, by employing large numbers of citizens in it, without regard to the need for work or qualification and the position occupied by the employee, and without providing new jobs, but things happened for recruitment only. Because of the pressure of tribe and prominent leaders, this led to doubling the size of the apparatus, and then suffered from the overcrowding of workers and employees who were not qualified for the job they occupied. The state apparatus also suffered from instability due to the movement of employees and workers from one ministry to another, so that the issue became linked to the change of governments and ministers⁸¹.

The issue of administrative reform of the Somali state apparatus has become an urgent issue a few years after independence, and the attempt of Prime Minister Abdul Razzaq Haj Hussein (1964-1967) was the most prominent effort towards reforming the apparatus in that period, as he made that issue one of the most important priorities in his government's program, despite the difficulties and sensitivity of the issue, and the pressures he faced from influential people in parliament and the government. Indeed, Abdul Razzaq formed a committee headed by a Canadian expert who prepared a comprehensive study on the matter. As a result of the study, the Prime Minister dismissed hundreds of employees who were hired through nepotism and without regard for efficiency, and corrected the situation of many. Among those dismissed from the service was the Prime Minister's own brother, which gave the reform process a great deal of credibility with the Somali public at the time⁸².

⁸¹() There are famous stories passed down from generation to generation about the dramatic events that took place in that period, which express the Somalis' problem with the state.

⁸²() For more see: Abdi Ismail Samater, *Africa's First democrats*, Op. Cit. P. 127-186

The military regime made a radical change in the nature of the Somali state, and removed the civilian political elite that led the country towards independence during the first decade after independence, and instead adopted the employees in the administrative apparatus in managing the affairs of the state, and showed great interest to the members of the apparatus in the early years of the coup, as stated in a speech to Siyad Barre addressed to civil servants, " You are the backbone of the nation, and you have a major role in managing the country regardless of who is in power. Governments come and go but civil servants remain in service"⁸³. The apparatus expanded in number, as more imposition was created in the first period of military rule due to the financial abundance that came as a result of the control of embezzlement and financial corruption that prevailed in the civil era, and the external financial support provided by the Soviet Union at the time. But the problem became worse than it was after the defeat of Somalia in the war against Ethiopia in 1978.

It had political and economic repercussions on the country, as the Somali economy deteriorated in the 1980s, and the exchange rate of the Somali shilling fell. In addition, inflation in living and corruption engulfed the entire joints of the country, and Somali artists crossed this rampant corruption in the cadres of the state with the play " Land cruzergadosobarigalay", which means "Own a Land Cruise car and live on the wheat aid provided to you by the world. "This made the issue of reform in the state apparatus, including the administrative apparatus, a distant one. Indeed, there were signs of the collapse of the state at the end of the 1980s.

(f) Political Tribalism

Tribalism represents the social structure of the Somali people, which consists of tribes, sub-tribes, and sub-tribes. Before the establishment of the complex modern central state, tribes were an independent social and political entity. European colonialism exploited the power of the political tribe and made it part of the colonial administration. When the national movement came and adopted the idea of nationalism and patriotism, it took an extremist

⁸³() Somali Democratic Republic, Ministry of Information and National Guidance, My country and my people, speeches and statements of President Siad Barre, p. 92.

stance towards tribes as a factor dividing the Somali people against patriotism and pan-nationalism. Some believe that it is one of the political mistakes of the Somali National Movement, especially the Youth Unity Party, to ignore and deny the tribal differences among Somalis, instead of dealing with them and trying to address them⁸⁴.

Supporters of the Somali National Movement (SYL) were persecuted by Italy in the first three years of guardianship, and anyone who walked at night was stopped and asked his tribe and then he was released. If he refused to mention his tribe, he was arrested because he was a member of the Somali National Movement. One night a young man was arrested and asked from which tribe are you (Chetue Cabila)? He said, "Tonight I am Abjal," but they⁸⁵ did not understand his intention, so he was released.

However, since the period of international tutelage (1950-1960) to prepare southern Somalia for independence, the need to represent the people and obtain votes in elections has led to the exploitation of tribalism by political parties, so the recognition of tribalism has become a reality and necessary to maintain popular circumvention of power, as well as for governments and parties to reflect the tribe spectrum, and thus the tribal quotas have become one of the foundations of the Somali⁸⁶ state since independence.

One of the most important pillars of tribe politics is that each tribe has been stationed in its own geographical area throughout the ages and acts as a state within the state, defending its borders from other tribes and complicating reconciliation and alliance with other tribes. The political leadership had to employ these pillars for the benefit of the Somali state, creating integration between different neighboring tribes and creating common interests for these tribes.

⁸⁴() Mohamed Turunji, Op.Cit. P. 426.

⁸⁵(²) Jamac Maxamed Qaalib, Taariikhda Somaaliya, page 95

⁸⁶() For more on this meaning, see the second section in Chapter Three, which deals with the foundations of Somali state-building.

The challenge of political tribalism, which was faced by the political elite in its occurrence, was manifested in the political duplicity that arose around the dilemma of reconciling party representation and tribe representation (the politician belongs to a tribe and a party at the same time), between the nationalist discourse that glorifies patriotism and the popular discourse directed at the tribe, and between the interests and demands of the tribe and the supreme interests of the country. The political elite faced the well-established idea of the tribe where its satisfaction with the government and its support for the party stops with the extent to which politicians and representatives of the party respond to its demands, as well as the extent to which there are individuals belonging to the tribe in the government. The repercussions of this dire point emerged in the competition for jobs between tribes and their vision of the official and the position that the official assumes as representing the tribe but does not represent the party or the general people, and therefore "tribal conflicts are seen as the prominent element in Somali politics and in the formation of the state and its fall⁽⁸⁷⁾.

To confront this phenomenon, the civilian political elite adopted a strategy of continuing the nationalist discourse that glorifies and rebukes tribalism through events, radio, and by writing dozens of songs, with the continuation of political duplicity in dealing with the tribe. The military regime took more radical and violent means, including - in addition to the previous nationalist discourse - the attempt to abolish the positions and titles of tribal leaders and the issuance of the law criminalizing tribalism. However, the dilemma has become more prominent after three decades of adopting the fight against it, and the Somali state has collapsed and the tribes have remained in existence, and the Somalis are still stuck with the problem of the vast distance between the expatriate national principles that whip the tribes and always call for their rejection and criminalize even the mere pronunciation of the tribe's name, and the reality that is based on loyalty to the tribes with deep roots in Somali culture, and there is still no approach between the two ideas to find a middle way

⁸⁷() Dr. Madubi Ali, op. Cit., P. 313.

to bring the state and society together, between tribalism and patriotism , and between the expatriate and the inherited.

External challenges

Just as the Somali state faced serious internal challenges, there were greater external challenges with regard to the political interaction between the Somali state and the international community., This contributed along with internal challenges, to the Somali state's deadlock after three decades of existence. As for the external challenges, the most important of them are: the regional conflict with neighboring countries over the lost territories, the identification in the Cold War, and the miscalculation and understanding of international politics.

(a) Regional conflict with neighboring countries over lost territory

One of the biggest external challenges that the Somali state has faced since its inception until now is the challenge of the conflict with the African neighboring countries of Ethiopia and Kenya over the Anfdi and Western Somalia (Ogaden) regions. The two countries' borders cover more than 90% of Somalia's international borders, and represent a fence that blocks Somalia from the African ocean. The conflict between Somalia and its neighbors dates back to the era of European scramble for Somali territory in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, which resulted in the division of the Somali people into five colonies under the administration of three European countries, Italy, Britain and France, in addition to Abyssinia. Since its inception in the early 1940s, the Somali National Liberation Movement has embraced the cause of the liberation of Greater Somalia, which includes the five Somali regions and their unification under one Somali state. The National Movement established branches in those regions that participated with the Mother Movement in the struggle for freedom and unity.

After the independence of the northern and southern regions and the establishment of the Somali Republic on July 1, 1960, the state adopted the issue of liberating the lost lands, and the Somali flag expressed this dream and a white star with five heads was placed in its center symbolizing the five Somali regions. In the constitution of unity and independence,

which was voted at the referendum in 1961, the state put articles specializing in the issue, and the successive Somali civilian and military governments put the issue in mind during the independence phase, and made it top of their priorities in their foreign policy and in their internal political program. The issue was not only a matter for governments, but in its various stages, it was an issue of Somali public opinion that governments cannot waive, as the government of Prime Minister Muhammad Ibrahim 'Uqal (1967-1969) was faced with a wave of accusations and betrayal by public opinion after concluding a truce agreement with the Kenyan government in 1967.

Because of Somalia's adoption of the issue of lost territories, the Somali state entered a political and diplomatic battle at the international and regional levels. Britain faced resistance because of its annexation of Anfadi territory to Kenya. After holding the referendum for the territory, the result was strong support for joining Somalia in 1963. The Somali state severed its relations with Britain, before being returned after four years of estrangement. It also faced France, which was occupying the French Somali region (Djibouti later) until the region gained its independence in 1977, as the Somali state paid a high price for that confrontation.

The two countries are traditional European colonial powers and the victorious Allied Powers in the Second World War, and they enjoy permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council. At the regional level, Somalia has engaged in a confrontation no less dangerous than its international battle with two major regional powers in Africa: Ethiopia and Kenya, which are among the countries with population size in the region, and among the influential countries in the Organization of African Unity, and Ethiopia hosts the headquarters of the African Organization.

Within the framework of its diplomatic and political confrontation with the two neighbors in the corridors of the African Organization, Somalia adopted the principle of the right of self-determination of the Somali people in the two regions. Ethiopia and Kenya on the other hand relied on the principles contained in the Charter of the Organization when it was founded. These are non-interference in the internal affairs of member states, respect for the

sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and its inalienable right to the independence of its entity, and the peaceful settlement of disputes through negotiation, mediation,⁸⁸ conciliation and arbitration. It also relied on the decision to keep the African borders as they are at the time of independence, which was taken at the second Cairo Conference of the Organization in 1964. In light of the legal basis provided by the African Organization, the two countries set out to coordinate their positions and tighten the noose on Somalia, and concluded the mutual defense agreement between them against Somalia in 1964.

The confrontation between the two parties included the use of all available mechanisms, including the military confrontation that took place between Somalia and Ethiopia in 1964 and 1977. The young Somali state suffered from the repercussions of these confrontations, which were the arms race in the region, the large spending on the army, the militarization of Somali society, the imposition of military service, and participation in the battle, which played a major role in the emergence of Somali armed opposition fronts, the ignition of the Somali civil war, and the subsequent⁸⁹ collapse of the state.

(C) Identification in the Cold War

Among the external challenges that arose with the independence of the Somali state was the Cold War, which had reached its peak at the time, the international polarization of the newly independent states, and Somalia's strategic location, which attracted the attention of the great powers, in addition to the intensity of the Arab-Israeli conflict in that period and its repercussions on Somalia. In the midst of the waves of the Cold War, the principle of positive neutrality taken by Somalia as an approach to its foreign policy did not work. Rather, its severe need for economic aid, military support and building its army to regain the lost lands prompted it to knock on all doors and try to participate on the tables of the two camps at the same time. This dual policy of the Somali state and the attempt to obtain

⁸⁸These principles are set out in Article III of the OAU Charter.

⁸⁹() For more results of the 1977/1978 war, see Mohamed Ibrahim Abdi, *The Problem of Western Somalia*, op. Cit., P. 99-106.

the support of both camps was manifested during civilian rule when Somalia was receiving foreign aid from the West through the Italian gate, and at the same time it was seeking the assistance of the Soviet Union.

This policy began with the conclusion of the Cooperation Agreement with the Soviets in 1961. It is remarkable that Italy, the colonial power of Somalia and its international patron, itself pursued the same political duality and tried in the period of the years - despite its close association with the United States - to establish relations with the eastern countries, and to have open options with the eastern countries⁹⁰. As a result, the Somali state faced political pressure from both camps, as this was not acceptable to them, due to the principles of non-alignment and friendship with all that Somalia tried to uphold ⁹¹.

Despite the identification of Somalia and its involvement in the cold war in the period of civilian rule, the degree of identification was less compared to the military regime that came to power in 1969. This ended the policy of duality in Somalia's relationship with the great powers and tried to obtain the aid of the two camps, as the military regime put its full weight on the eastern camp, turning its back to the West, while maintaining strong and exceptional relations with Italy., Somalia received as a result of that step significant military and economic assistance from the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc countries, as the Somali port of Berbera became the largest Soviet military base outside Eastern Europe. Given the Western refusal to provide Somalia with weapons to confront its Ethiopian opponent is one of the most important reasons that prompted it to join the eastern camp. Somalia faced again after six years of joining the eastern camp the dilemma of turning Ethiopia, led by Mengistu, towards the eastern bloc.

⁹⁰() Paolo Tripodi, *Italy and Somalia: a Singular Relationship*, International Relations, Published by sage 1998, P. 63

⁹¹() Abdi Ismail Samater, *Africa's First democrats*, Op. Cit. P. 167.

This brought Somalia into a political impasse, so that the common Somali and Soviet interests to confront pro-Western Ethiopia were no longer valid, after Ethiopia's new leaders embraced the communist ideology and joined the camp that also includes Somalia. Somalia tried to break the impasse by waging war on socialist Ethiopia in 1977, putting the Soviets in front of the fait accompli. Somalia paid a high price as a result of that reckless step, after the eastern camp stood with its full weight with Ethiopia and defeated Somalia. Hence the sudden shift of Somali position from the Cold War and returning to the arms of the western camp. Berbera therefore turned after a few years of being the largest Soviet base in the region into the largest American base in the Horn of Africa in 1978.

Thus, Somalia's changing position from the two rival blocs in the Cold War three times during the two decades following independence, the identification in the Cold War as well as the radical and rapid transformation of its international alliances represented a major challenge to its foreign policy. This brought it into a political impasse that had negative effects and consequences that exceeded the absorption of the Somali state and its ability to withstand these transformations.

On the other hand, the two superpowers withdrew their support for the Somali state and classified the Somali President as discolored and unreliable in his dealings with major countries.

(b) Miscalculation and misunderstanding of international policy

The failure of the Somali leadership to understand and read international politics correctly and realistically, its miscalculation of its positions on international issues, its defiance of major countries many times, and its use of coarse and tactless diplomacy with friends, international competitors, and adversaries are among the biggest external challenges facing the Somali state. This dilemma began with the commencement of the modern national movement in the 1940s, through the stage of the international guardianship of southern Somalia (1950-1960) and ending with the stage of national independence during the three decades in which the Somali state lived before its collapse altogether in 1991. One of the most prominent examples is the demand of the leaders of the Somali National Movement, represented by the Somali Youth League Party, for the collective tutelage of the four

victorious Allied powers in the war, instead of the British tutelage that Britain wanted, which could have contributed to the unification of the Somali regions that were under British administration.

One of those positions that foretells a miscalculation that is political, is the issue of the clash with Italy after the declaration of international guardianship over Somalia, due to the fears of the Youth Unity Party of prolonging the UN guardianship. Despite the Italian assurances and despite the difficulty of this possibility for Italy, which is bound by the UN resolution. The matter was not specific to the Youth Unity Party, but included other parties, as the opposition parties such as Dujail and Marfali were busy searching in that period for opportunities to prolong international guardianship. The Somalis mistakenly believed that they or Italy could act with such ease and simplicity in the fate of the region after the UN decided on the status⁹² of the region. The issue of urgency and the provision of independence six months before the scheduled date in December 1960 was one of the things that indicated inexperience, despite the essentially short period of time and its insufficiency in completing the work and tasks that were required by the Somali state-building process and preparing Somalis to take over the leadership of their country and the administration of the state.

The failure of the Somali leadership in the foreign policy file and dealing with the international community since the early period of preparing the Somalis to hand over the Somali state is due to several factors. These include: Italy's monopoly on defense and foreign policy during the guardianship stage, the failure to prepare the Somali national leaders to assume that responsibility by not involving them in foreign policy decision-making, and postponing this until independence. Another reason was the inexperience of the leadership and its young age, as the majority of the party leadership after independence, for example, was in their thirties. When the Constitution was drafted in 1961 and then the

⁹²() For more on this topic, see: Mohamed Turunji, Op.Cit. P. 243-246.

age of candidacy for the post of President of the Republic was set at forty years, many prominent members of the main parties in the north and south were unable to run because of this condition, including Abdullah Issa, and all ministers from the Northern Territory in the government at the time were under the legal age to be candidates⁹³ for the office.

The dilemma of misunderstanding between Somalia and the international community and the clash with major powers continued during the period of civilian rule, despite the adoption of the principle of positive neutrality in Somali foreign policy and Somalia's attempts to win international friends, and establish diplomatic relations with twenty-six countries and international organizations⁹⁴. One of the biggest crises in Somali foreign policy and one of the boldest steps taken by the Somali leadership during civilian rule in the 1960s was the step of severing relations with Britain after the annexation of the region to Kenya in 1963, within the framework of Somalia's policy towards the achievement of Greater Somalia. This step coincided with the intensification of the diplomatic conflict with France to force it to grant the right of self-determination to the French Somali region (Djibouti). Somali-Italian relations were also damaged after Somalia received military assistance from the Soviet Union during the period 1964-1967, before Mohamed Ibrahim Aqal, Prime Minister of Somalia (1967-1969), restored the relations of the two countries to⁹⁵ their normal course.

The Somali leadership failed to understand the magnitude of the challenge required to change the borders that African countries inherited from the colonial powers, especially by African countries and the Organization of African Unity itself. This meant that the borders remained as they were at the time of independence, and the magnitude of the cost paid by the emerging Somali state as a result of its challenge with the major European powers

⁹³() Mohamed Turunji, Op.Cit. P. 350.

⁹⁴() Hamdi Al-Sayed Salem, op. Cit., P.: 418

⁹⁵() Paolo Tripodi, Op.Cit. P. 55.

represented by Britain and France, the two colonial European countries and the prominent members of the Security Council remained the same.

Somalia's diplomacy with the major powers intensified during the military rule (1969-1991), where the regime's direction witnessed sharp political fluctuations represented in the change of Somalia's position from the major powers twice during one decade (1969-1978). As the regime initially headed towards the Soviet Union with all its weight, and established close relations with it, and the Soviets accordingly provided military and economic assistance to Somalia, things quickly changed after the decision of the war against Ethiopia in 1977. Hence the regime struck off seventeen years of close relations between the two countries in disregard, and rejected the advice of the Eastern Camp countries at the Aden Conference in March 1977. ⁹⁶They cut off relations with the Soviets, at a time when all the Somali army had weapons, ammunition and equipment that came from the Soviet Union, so how could it fight a war in this situation? The regime joined the US-led Western camp in April 1978. Thus, the Somali leadership failed again when it made political miscalculations in estimating the size of the reaction of those forces from the sudden Somali transformation, especially when they realized that they were exploited for the benefit of the smaller ally and compromised their pride. The Somali leadership made a mistake when it believed that it could impose its agenda on the major powers, and then change the African borders recognized by the African Organization on its own.

One of the situations that indicates the miscalculation of the Somali leadership and their failure to study their decisions is that West Germany had been providing support to the Somali police since the exploitation of weapons, equipment and cars, but West Germany cut off its assistance to the Somali police after the military regime recognized East Germany. What did East Germany provide to Somalia to build the worst prison in Somalia

⁹⁶() For more on the Aden Conference and its decisions, see: Mohamed Ibrahim Abdi, *The Problem of Western Somalia and Its Impact on Arab-African Relations*, op. Cit., P.88-94.

for Batangro (labatanjirow)? The Somali government replaced the police assistance program to build only a prison.⁹⁷

In light of the drought and seasonal floods, "the European Union built weather forecasting stations to know the dry and rainy seasons to confront them before they occur, but it was surprised that the Somali state could not afford fuel costs." ⁹⁸ However, it is fighting battles and confronting major countries.

Needless to say, one of the biggest external political challenges faced by the Somali state was the attempt of the Somali leadership to play a political role greater than its size, and to break the pride of the major powers, without appreciating the cost of that role and the damage it will cause to Somalia's strategic interests, its international and regional status, and its balance with its allies, which is one of the factors that ultimately contributed to the restriction of the Somali state and its subsequent collapse.

The second issue - Economic challenges

The economic challenges are one of the biggest challenges faced by the Somali state since the beginning of talk about its independence and before the southern region was placed under international trusteeship in 1950. The most prominent question among the international parties concerned for that period was: about the possibility of providing sufficient and permanent economic resources to the Somali state in the event that it was granted independence. The problem was not the lack of resources and their unavailability, but the dilemma was how to exploit and invest those resources (the country was not poor but there is a failed state). On this basis, the southern and northern Somali regions that formed the Somali Republic after independence from the colonial countries, Britain and Italy, did not inherit a significant economic structure during their colonization of the country.

⁹⁷-Peter Bridge, Safiir, page 88-89, waa safiirka maraykanka ee Somaliya 1984-1986.

⁹⁸-Peter, page 77

The colonial countries, Britain and Italy, failed to achieve a degree of economic development in the two regions that would later enable the Somali state to survive economically and provide an opportunity to exploit the natural resources owned by Somalia. Written colonial literature dealing with the history of Somalia in that period underestimates the importance of the economic factor in the colonization of the region, and places the responsibility for economic underdevelopment on the citizens of the region⁹⁹. The dilemma of economic underdevelopment became an urgent issue after the placing of Italian Somalia under international trusteeship (1950-1960).

The United Nations assumed responsibility for providing the budget of the region and entrusting Italy with the task of developing the resources of the region during the trusteeship period, so that the Somali state after the end of the trusteeship period could rely on itself. However, Italy did not succeed in carrying out that task entrusted to it and developing the¹⁰⁰ economic resources of the region. The period of international trusteeship ended without achieving the objectives of the economic development of the region. Therefore, it became imperative for the United Nations to continue economic support for the nascent state in the hope of achieving the Somali national leadership after independence; what the European powers were unable to achieve.

The situation in the British protectorate in the north was not better than the south, but it was worse than it economically, as it did not get the opportunity to prepare for independence as compared to what happened in the south. Britain decided at the end of the fifties in the twentieth century to grant the northern region freedom to independence. As the northern region joined the southern region, it was in a worse economic situation than the south, which increased the burden of the crisis of economic underdevelopment suffered by the emerging Somali state consisting of the two regions.

⁹⁹() Bernard Braine, Op. Cit. P. 195.

¹⁰⁰() For more on this subject, see the second topic in Chapter Three regarding the foundations of building the Somali state.

On this basis, the Somali state emerged in the womb of the economic dilemma that surrounded and suffocated it. The challenges included all economic fields, including the development and implementation of economic development plans, the permanent deficit in the public budget, the deficit in the trade balance, the failure to diversify the sources of the economy, and dependence on foreign aid, in addition to the natural disasters that periodically destroyed the fragile Somali economy, including the repeated droughts that caused the death of animals, and the destruction of the agricultural crop that depends on rain. The floods were destroying the lives of the inhabitants of the banks of the Shabelle and Juba rivers in the south. They caused the spread of famine that was striking the majority of Somalia's nomadic population that was dependent on grazing in the country, so the Somali state lived between the failure of economic development and natural disasters.

In the midst of attempts to answer the question of how to find sufficient economic resources to manage the Somali state that has emerged since the international tutelage (1950-1960), one of the available alternatives that was raised, was the issue of the possibility of discovering oil in the country, as American companies had been drilling oil in Somalia since the era of international tutelage. One British writer pointed out those questions and fears about the economic fate of the Somali state after independence when he said, "Somalia is unlikely to be economically viable. There is a feverish search for oil going on but nothing has been found. Significant difficulties will arise at the outset if the Italians withdraw before settling the issue of foreign aid "⁽¹⁰¹⁾. Despite the existence of this alternative, Somali leaders did not prioritize the state administration after taking over the economic dilemma and did not invest their efforts towards focusing on those alternatives. On the other hand, due to the political instability of the Somali state and its movement between the Cold War camps, this unfavorable atmosphere did not encourage America and its oil companies to continue the issue of searching for oil and investing in this field.

¹⁰¹() Bernard Braine, *The Somali Question*, Op. Cit. P. 192.

Due to this, the Somali state was established in 1960 and ranked among the 20 poorest countries in the world at the time, where three quarters of the population lived below the poverty line and it¹⁰²was a very high percentage. The growth of the Somali economy in the senate decade was slow, reaching 1.3%, which is less than the annual population growth rate, which reached 2.6%¹⁰³. The country was heavily dependent on foreign aid, accounting for more than 70% of its overall state budget¹⁰⁴. Despite this tragic situation, the country's leaders were not up to that challenge, and during the independence period they did not worry about the magnitude of the economic problem¹⁰⁵ awaiting them, nor about the scarce state resources or economic development plans that did not materialize, and they treated the issue of aid as if it had been a permanent resource that will not run out, but continue indefinitely.

Instead of focusing on the economic dilemma, and searching for ways to make the state viable and sustainable, the political elite turned its attention to political competition and the issue of lost lands. Rather, it went to corruption and the plundering of public funds, as the state seemed to work for the benefit of the ruling elite alone. This is a general feature of African countries, as "the state in Africa accounted for its surplus and the revenues of agricultural exports, especially through marketing bodies, excessive valuation of the national currency, and the distribution of public expenditures. The extent of those developments and the patterns of their institutions and the social groups that have benefited

¹⁰²() Iraqi Abdulaziz Mustafa, Key Features and Problems of Economic Performance in Somalia, Comprehensive Survey of the Somali Democratic Republic, Arab Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization, Institute of Arab Research and Studies, Baghdad 1982, p. 354.

¹⁰³() Jamil Abdalla Mubarak, From Bad Policy to Chaos in Somalia- How an Economy Fell Apart, Praegar Publishers, USA, 1996, P. 11.

¹⁰⁴() World Development Report 1981, Op, cit. p.56

¹⁰⁵() Mohammed Sheikh Othman.

from them may vary from country to country. However, a small number of systems formed only an exception to the general rule. "¹⁰⁶⁾

The dealing of the ruling military elite (1969-1991) with the economic dilemma did not change much from its civilian counterpart during the civil era (1960-1969), despite the attempts made by the military in the early years of their rule. The military government began with serious attempts to deal with the economic crisis, and realized that the solution to that crisis was linked to the extent to which it obtained the legitimacy that the civilian elite lost after its failure to achieve economic demands. In a speech to President Mohamed Siad Barre on the occasion of Independence Day Somalia on July 1, 1970, almost a year after his rule, he said, "We understand well that we will be judged by our economic policy and according to the success or failure we record in¹⁰⁷ this field."

The military government obtained a financial surplus in the early years of its rule, especially from the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, and benefited from drying up the sources by the corruption practiced by the civilian elite and returning them to the state treasury, which created a sense of satisfaction and optimism among the general public in the early years of military rule.

On this basis, the military regime took a number of steps and measures in the 1970s aimed at reviving the national economy, including the development of three economic development plans (1971-1974, 1975-1978, 1979-1981). The regime also made¹⁰⁸ attempts to diversify the Somali economy by taking advantage of the promising uninvested sectors

¹⁰⁶⁾ Jean-François Bayard, *The Politics of Filling the Bellies - The Sociology of the African State*, translated by Halim Tunson, Third World House - Cairo, First Edition 1992, p. 86.

¹⁰⁷⁾ Somali Democratic Republic, Ministry of Information and National Guidance, *President Mohamed Siad's Speech Collection*, 1971, p. 98.

^{108.} Somali Democratic Republic, Ministry of Information and National Guidance, *Economic Progress*, p. 3.

in the country, including the fisheries sector, where the Ministry of Fish was established in 1973, and a budget was set for it in the three-year development plan (1974-1978), and the diversification of Somali agricultural exports, as it relied on the cultivation of bananas only. An attempt was made to cultivate grapes and manufacture these products through the establishment¹⁰⁹ of fruit canning factory. A number of factories were also renovated and developed, including the manufacturers of IsnaiBiassi sugar, spinning and weaving, cigarettes and sulfur,¹¹⁰ leather and shoes.

These attempts at economic development made by the military government in the 1970s were unsuccessful and economic development plans and projects were not implemented for a number of reasons and internal and external factors. These included the severe drought that hit a number of African regions, including the Horn of Africa, and caused the death of a third of the animals in the country¹¹¹, which was the backbone of the Somali economy, and provided 40% of the hard currency of the state.¹¹² In addition, there was the Somali-Ethiopian war in 1977/1978, and its catastrophic economic and social effects on the country, and the cessation of technical aid provided by the Soviet Union to support development projects, after the severance of diplomatic relations between the two countries following the Soviets' opposition to the war and standing by Ethiopia. However, settlements were established in the coasts in a number¹¹³ of coastal areas.

Despite the US assistance to Somalia in the 1980s and the government's attempts to restructure the Somali economy, this did not help the Somali economy, but rather exacerbated the political and economic problems, as the Somali economy witnessed a state

¹⁰⁹Ibid, p. 10.

¹¹⁰Ibid., pp. 31-32.

¹¹¹⁰ Jamil Abdalla Mubarak, Op. Cit. P. 14.

¹¹²⁰ Metz, Helen Chapin (editor), Somalia- a Country Study, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, May 1992, 141-142.

¹¹³⁰ Economic Progress, p. 24.

of stagnation, and then returned to the first stage, and reliance on the outside increased. The general budget deficit in 1981, for example, amounted to 734 million Somali shillings, an increase of 270% in just two years. The Somali government has been resorting to the banking system to cover the deficit, which has increased the government's indebtedness and increased the burden on the system itself¹¹⁴. Despite this, the administrative apparatus of the state expanded from eighteen thousand employees before the military coup in 1969, to more than fifty thousand in 1985, and at a time when the apparatus was witnessing steady growth during the 1980s, the trained and skilled labor force was leaking out of the country, due to the crisis political situation, tribal bias, and inflation in living¹¹⁵.

As a result of the accumulation of crises, the deterioration of government performance the decline of public institutions, and the decrease in foreign and domestic investments and international aid, Somalia began to disappear from the periodic reports of international institutions concerned with the economy since the mid-1980s due to the lack¹¹⁶of economic data and statistics. The security situation worsened due to the expansion of military operations between the army and factions opposed to the regime of President Barre. In this period, the Somali army was fighting its people. Western reports indicated the complete collapse of the Somali state and that the state broke like glass, which ultimately led to the collapse of the economy, and then the collapse of the state after the arrival of battles in Mogadishu and the overthrow of President Barre in January 1991.

The third issue - Social challenges

The social challenges faced by the Somali state after gaining independence are one of the problems and obstacles that have burdened the state, affected the unity of the Somali

¹¹⁴() Mohamed Ibrahim Abdi, The Role of the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development in Support of the Somali Economy, Journal of the University of Mogadishu, Second Issue, 2016, p. 76.

¹¹⁵() Jamil Abdalla Mubarak, Op. Cit. P. 62

¹¹⁶() Mohamed Ibrahim Abdi, the role of the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development in supporting the Somali economy, op. Cit., P. 76.

people, and thus hindered state-building and ultimately contributed to its collapse and the difficulty of rebuilding it. Social challenges can be summarized by the following four factors: tribal conflict, identity problems, the challenge of national integration, and large waves of migration from the countryside to the capital and major cities. These challenges include problems related to the community's relationship with the state, others related to interrelationships in Somali society, and a third group of challenges related to the relationship of Somali society with the Arab and African regional environment.

(1) Tribal conflict: The traditional conflict between Somali tribes over natural resources represented by pastures, water and livestock was one of the factors that led to instability. The conflict between tribes has represented two levels of conflict that must be distinguished. The first is the traditional conflict between tribes in the countryside over natural resources. This type of conflict has existed since ancient times between Somali tribes. The second level of conflict is represented in the conflict between tribes in state institutions and in political influence and positions. This type of conflict prevails in cities, and both types of conflict are led by tribe leaders. As for political tribalism, it is led by the political elite that are struggling to acquire positions and obtain political gains, using the tribe as one of the tools of the conflict. We have talked about it in political challenges. It is not the field of our discussion in this topic, despite the overlap between them and the difficulty of differentiating between them in writing and dealing with it.

On this basis, the tribe was a social entity that performed many functions within and outside the tribe (with other tribes), conducted war and peace, and made peace with other tribes. The tribe is the basis of Somali society, as it is the political, economic and social unit. The Somali tribe is characterized by weak nationalism, because political awareness is constrained by tribe boundaries¹¹⁷.

¹¹⁷() Dr. Ali Hassan Muhammad Ali, *Tribalism and the Crisis of Governance in Somalia in 1960-1995*, p. 26

The role of the tribe changed after the advent of European colonialism in the Somali territories. On the traditional social and political side, which was played by its leaders, the tribe now plays a new and different political role from the previous one, as the Europeans employed the tribes for their interests, and benefited from the contradiction of those interests. Tribe elders were also hired and received salaries from the colonizer. Some sources reported that the tribal sheikhs who received salaries in the south from the Italian administration were 950 Sheikhs, while in the north there were 361 Sheikhs who received salaries from the British authorities¹¹⁸. This new employment of the tribe resulted in it having a social and political role in the city that it exercises to achieve its interests within the colonial institutions and then the institutions of the Somali state after independence. Britain "gained the loyalty of the tribal sheikhs and made them agents of the colonial administration"⁽¹¹⁹⁾.

On this basis, tribalism molded by political stereotypes penetrated into the structures of the Somali state and its various institutions emerged, so that tribal Sheikhs managed the conflict between the state and the tribe instead of managing the conflict between the tribes, and greed became the master of the situation as each tribe began to seek the greatest number of positions in the state. People saw the President and the Prime Minister not as representing the whole country but as individuals representing their tribes.¹²⁰ Successive governments were founded in the name of the tribes (the State of Saad, the State of Mahmoud Suleiman, and the State of Rihan), based on the affiliation of the personality of the President of the country and the Prime Minister.

As it seems, the transformation of the issue of traditional tribal conflict after the advent of European colonialism into a political conflict in the cities over state institutions, positions

¹¹⁸() Dr. Abdul Rahman Abdullahi (Badio), History of Somalia (Arabic Version), Part I, op. Cit., P. 123.

¹¹⁹() Dr. Huda Muhammad Abdi, The Colonial Rivalry between Britain and Italy in the Arab World and East Africa, p. 421

¹²⁰() Mohamed Turunji, Op.Cit. P. 339.

and sources of income, is no longer an issue specific to the Somali situation, but rather a general phenomenon in Africa, as is the Somali society in that, like most African societies, where Jean-François Bayard asserts that "under the contemporary state, the preferred reference in this regard is likely linked to economic as well as political accumulation. It is more and more recognized that the tribe has become a channel through which competition is achieved in order to obtain wealth, power and status rather than being a political force in itself. Examples are plentiful. The tensions between the Igbo and the non-Igbo in Port-Harcourt, and between the Yoruba and the Hausa in Ibadan, reveal not so much abstract linguistic or cultural contradictions as the conflict over the city and its resources, and the control of the cola and cattle trade in the second case¹²¹. "

Despite this great transformation that took place in the nature of the tribe's social and political function in the colonial era, which still exists where conflicts in the past were based on economic resources such as pastures, water, land, and livestock, this type of conflict did not end. At the time when the competition was taking place in the cities between the tribes in the state institutions at the stage of preparing Somalia for independence, the intense conflict between the tribes' areas of influence also continued in the Bawadi. As one writer pointed out that phenomenon at the time, stressing that the interest of the Somali tribes in the borders of the pastures of their animals - during the guardianship period and the intensification of the Italian-Ethiopian dispute - was greater than their interest in the international borders and the conflict with Abysshe, which continued between Somalia and Ethiopia¹²² at the regional level. This was in the case of nomadic pastoralism, but in the case of civilization it was accompanied by politics and the economy to serve one another. Some summarized the sources of tribal conflict in Somalia, whether in cities or in the countryside and the desert, into " four basic categories: the

¹²¹Jean-François Abayard, op.Cit., P. 78.

¹²²() Rebert L. Hess, Op. Cit. P. 194.

manipulation of elites, the struggle for social justice and equality, historical memories, and environmental pressures⁽¹²³⁾."

This conflict between Somali tribes in the desert over natural resources, or in their struggle for positions and state resources in cities, posed a social challenge that contributed to social and political instability, whether in the capital, cities or in the desert. This dispersed the state's modest efforts in building political and social unity, building state institutions and gaining the satisfaction of various segments of the Somali people, and also contributed to weakening them in their confrontation with regional and international forces that have been in constant conflict with them since independence. The tribal conflict reached the family level within the same tribe in the Somali political society, as happened to the family of former President Mohamed Siad Barre on the last day of his regime.

(2) The challenge of national integration: One of the social factors that contribute to the strength of the state is the strength of its social fabric, and the extent to which it is able to achieve national integration among the components of its people. On this basis, just as tribal conflict posed a social challenge to the project of the Somali state, so did the issue of national integration after unity between the north and the south and the achievement of independence was another social challenge that had a negative impact on national unity. In the same way, despite the existence of the elements of national unity among the components of the Somali people in terms of linguistic, religious and ethnic unity and living in a continuous geographical area, the cultural and political differences that arose from the divergence of the pattern of colonization between the northern and southern regions, from which the Somali state arose, resulted in some disparities that placed the responsibility of the emerging state on addressing these social and cultural disparities between the south and the north. After independence, these disparities were the biggest

¹²³() Dr. Madouni Ali, *The Limitations of State-Building Requirements in Africa and their Implications for Security and Stability*, PhD Thesis at Mohamed Khudair University, Algeria, 2013-2014, p. 314.

obstacle to national integration, and the process of removing these obstacles was also one of the biggest social challenges that awaited the Somali National Unity Government.

Indeed, the union between the Northern and Southern Provinces after more than 70 years of living under two modes of colonialism has left behind many important inherited issues, the most important of which are four main issues: the **sharing of power between the two parties**, the **issue of the national language (English and Italian)**, the **unification of administrative systems, and the choice of the capital** ⁽¹²⁴⁾." The unification in a hurry of two different regions with such a degree of disparity, and not putting those sensitive issues - the size of the issue of language and power-sharing - in the new constitution more clearly, and leaving it to side understandings and political bargaining, and dealing with them under the tables was very dangerous.

The emerging issue of the expansion of the area of the Republic - Hargeisa is more than 1,500 km from the capital Mogadishu, for example - without the availability of paved roads, telephone lines and flights linking the parts of the Republic, with the modest development allocations to the provinces in general - the northern political and social elite of the region-imposed migration to Mogadishu. Then the sense of marginalization of northern citizens prevailed under the political and administrative centralization of the state at the time, and their sense of distance from the central government prevailed as they used to have deputies and officials close to¹²⁵ them in the past. The 1961 coup attempt, in which junior army officers from the north separated the north from the south, was an early indication of a state of political protest among the northerners about their status in the new state after unification.¹²⁶ This attempt was also an early threat to the Somali state and was widely seen as a message of protest against the lack of conviction of public opinion in the

¹²⁴() Dr. Madouni Ali, op. Cit., P. 134.

¹²⁵() Abdi Ismail Samater, Op. Cit. P. 113.

¹²⁶() Dr. Mudouni Ali, op. Cit., P. 134.

north about the level of representation of the northerners¹²⁷ in the political system, especially the largest northern tribe (Isaaq).

The poets expressed this dissatisfaction, as Abdullah Sultan Ta 'adhi said: Duqaydii Baarlmaanka iyo Dakadii xamar baa leh. He said that everything went to Mogadishu and there was nothing left for Hargeisa and he was alerting the Somali political leadership to review the matter and start resolving it before it escalated.

(3) Somali Identity Problems: Identity is generally defined as “the ways in which individuals and groups are distinguished in their social relations with other individuals¹²⁸ and groups”. There is social identity defined by sociologists as how people classify themselves as members of a particular group, such as nation, social class, subculture, race, gender, etc. Cultural identity: is essentially a sense of belonging to a cultural group, a subset of social identity that focuses on cultural components. It is a shared collective cultural memory owned by people who share the same history, ancestry, and ethnicity.¹²⁹ Cultural identity is influenced by many factors, such as religion, language, class, skin color, ancestry, etc. In other words, cultural identity is the cornerstone of a person's being¹³⁰.

The traditional Somali social and cultural identity before the restructuring process practiced by the colonial authorities on the Somali people was based on two main axes: Islam and the tribe. However, after the advent of European colonization, the process of reshaping the Somali identity took place as new elements were added, a new culture was created, and this process continued after independence and during national rule. Colonialism dispersed

¹²⁷Ibid., p. 136.

¹²⁸() Richard Jenkins, *Social Identity* (London: Routledge, 1996), P. 282.

¹²⁹() Stuart Hall, "Identity, Community, Culture, Difference." In *Cultural Identity and Diaspora*, Edited by J. Rutherford (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1990), 17–46

¹³⁰() Dr. Abdul Rahman Abdullahi (Badio), *History of Somalia (Arabic Version) Part II*, op. Cit., P. 286.

the Somali identity when it made the colonial borders and divided the Somali people in a way that did not happen to any other people on the African continent, and this policy was the first blow to the Somali identity, "and the cultural system was the most targeted and affected by the colonial heritage after the imposition of colonialism its culture and language (131)."

The social lifestyle imposed by colonialism and the transformation of the social leadership of scholars and tribe leaders into a segment made out of the mantle of colonialism under the name of the political elite is the first transformation and exposure of Somali identity to setbacks when this segment dealt with the elements of Somali identity (Islam, language and history) as the causes of underdevelopment in Somali society, and the presentation of the Western model as an alternative to the value and moral system of society, which led to the emergence of "a great difficulty in reconciling the demands of the modern state, tribal culture and inconsistent Islamic identity, as most of the members of the new political leadership were employed in very modest jobs at the time of colonialism, and graduated in basic schools, and hence the element of function and culture became a bridge linking colonialism to the new system.

Despite the homogeneity of the Somali people in terms of language, traditions, religion and common history, during the colonial era and national rule, a conflict took place in the cultural and intellectual identity and regional development of the Somali people around the pillars of: language, culture, tribalism, Islam, secularism, citizenship, Arabism and Africanism. These conflicts took place at the level of the general public, between the elite themselves, between the city and the desert, and between the state and society. This was part of the social challenges that the process of rebuilding the state and society in Somalia faced.

¹³¹() Dr. Abdurahman Abdullahi (Baadiyow) Making Sense of Somali History, Vol. 2, Op. Cit. P.102.

At the end of the chapter, despite the magnitude of those political, economic and social challenges that were impeding the building of Somali national unity and state-building, the Somali political elite did not give enough attention to solving these problems and dealing with them seriously. Ironically, most of the foundations on which the Somali state was founded, including the foundations of the ethnic state and dependence on foreign aid, have themselves become a challenge and a hindrance to building the state and the nation together. Instead of taking these challenges seriously and addressing the imbalances in the political, economic and social structure of the state, political leaders have taken care to share the pie, to burden the fragile state with more than it can bear, and to target the fragile social fabric, which hasten the collapse of society and the state together, which we will study in the next chapter.

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